

- With increased logistical support, over time, the United Nations could evolve into an “umbrella” body providing timely early warning of potential crises and conflicts, and providing the information needed for verification of compliance with multilateral treaties.
- The United Nations could perform a valuable service by establishing a capability for acquiring, integrating and analysing information from a variety of sources to assist in verifying compliance with multilateral and regional agreements.
- The UN should hasten the implementation of an advanced management information system to handle the volume of data that could become available via the various collection means and via registers of arms transfers or military budgets.
- For purposes of effective verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures, the UN should consider establishing some multinational centres, such as a Centre for Monitoring Space Activities, a Centre for Monitoring Activities at Sea, and a Centre or Centres for Development of Co-operative Monitoring Equipment, Methodologies and Training.
- The ultimate degree of harmonization and synergy would be attained by establishing under the United Nations an overall body charged with preventive diplomacy, implementing global and regional arms control agreements, handling non-compliance, and constraining proliferation. However, although these missions are gradually converging toward a common goal of co-operative security, they are sufficiently different, their state of development is so far incomplete, and acceptance by nation states of such a degree of sharing responsibility for security is not sufficient for such an overall and universal integration to be practical at the present time. Therefore, establishing this harmonization and synergy would have to be done in steps.

### Synergies between the Processes of Arms Control Verification, Confidence-Building Measures and Peace Operations

- As Table 2 indicates, the methods developed for the three processes have different names, but their functions, when viewed generically, are very similar.
- Co-ordinating and combining these generic functions provides opportunities for numerous synergies, as shown in Table 3.
- As demonstrated in the verification of the Sinai Agreements, a multi-method verification system with mutually reinforcing, interlocking responsibilities strengthens the viability of the disengagement process, and the synergies produced by the integration of individual monitoring components contribute to the creation of an effective verification system.
- There are high value synergies associated with the combination of international technical means (ITM)/ multilateral technical means (MTM) and data exchanges, notifications, on-site inspections, confidence-building measures, and activities associated with peace operations.
- Whatever the process, co-operative monitoring—the multi-method, multiparty collection and analysis of information—has an important role to play in the *global* non-proliferation arena, for example, in monitoring the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a cut-off in the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, and a comprehensive test ban.
- Complete resolution of the underlying sources of regional instabilities will be long in coming. More hopeful are intermediate steps: the adoption of confidence-building measures, the negotiation of regional or local arms control agreements, and /or the acceptance of peace operations under the auspices of the United Nations.

