

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

The question of reservations is linked to the issue of article XII, on the relationship between the convention and other international treaties. In this regard, Sweden has again expressed its strongly felt conviction that no reservation should be possible with regard to the scope of the convention, which, as of its entry into force, must unambiguously rule out the use of chemical weapons, i.e. any use of chemical weapons under any circumstances. Reservations to this fundamental obligation of the convention should be explicitly prohibited.

There is also reason to take note with appreciation of the results achieved in Working Group 3 on institutional matters, under the soft-spoken but firm stewardship of Mr. Sood of India. This relates to the new text on article VII as well as the progress made regarding the Preparatory Commission. However, the most difficult issue in the area of institutions - the composition, functions, and decision-making of the Executive Council - has not yet been addressed. My delegation hopes that the informal consultations now being held by the Chairman of the Committee will facilitate consideration of this issue in the summer. Sweden's basic and pragmatic views on the subject were stated by my predecessor in September last year. I will not repeat them here. The important thing now is that delegations take a flexible and constructive approach to the question of the Executive Council. This constitutes one of the politically most complex outstanding issues.

In the institutional area my delegation welcomes the fact that the French delegation has now elaborated its proposal for a Scientific Advisory Council. While time has not permitted detailed study of the proposal, Sweden supports its general outline.

The matters considered in Working Group 4 under the chairmanship of Mr. Molander cover a complex area of highly technical issues, sometimes with important political implications. It goes without saying that my delegation welcomes the substantive progress made concerning the annex to article VI [1] and the proposed new annex on chemicals.

As regards the annex to article VI [1], the new text brought to the attention of the Committee in working paper 4/12/Rev.1 of the Group seems to offer the parameters for a comprehensive solution of the question of production and synthesis of schedule [1] chemicals. Hopefully delegations will be able to reach a compromise during the summer session. In the view of Sweden, there should be a possibility of declaring at the end of each calendar year at least those laboratories which have synthesized schedule [1] chemicals for protective purposes.

As far as verification, in this context, is concerned the view of my delegation is well known. Verification must be applied to a stage of the research and development process where it would conceivably be possible to demonstrate a violation of the convention, or at least a serious inexplicable anomaly. This would hardly be possible before research and development have left the laboratory and entered a pilot plant or testing phase. Trying to verify what is not verifiable does not create confidence. Verification must be applied to what is relevant and significant.