Vishinsky knows this. He therefore does not reject openly the principle of international cooperation for atomic control. But he seeks to limit it so drastically that his proposals have seemed to every non-Communist country which has examined them utterly ineffective. Frankly, the Soviet proposals for atomic energy control have seemed to us a cynical and heartless trick. If they are not intended to be so, then I would be grateful if Mr. Vishinsky would reassure us on this point.

For example, will Mr. Vishinsky tell us now that he is prepared, on a basis of reciprocity, to allow international inspectors to go anywhere, at any time, in the Soviet Union, to the extent necessary to satisfy themselves and the world that no clandestine operations are taking place for the production of atomic explosives?

Is Mr. Vishinsky prepared to accept quotas, if other nations will also do so, on the amount of nuclear fuel to be produced in his territory?

Is Mr. Vishinsky prepared, as the rest of us are, to accept limits to the size and nature of atomic energy facilities to be maintained in his territory?

Is Mr. Vishinsky prepared, as the rest of us are, to give up the right of his Government to act alone to produce and possess atomic explosives, so that the world may have confidence that such explosives can never be used in a surprise attack on the cities of men? I ask these questions in all seriousness. I know that Mr. Vishinsky stated that he will allow international inspectors to visit, at periodic and pre-arranged times, such atomic energy facilities as he may choose to declare to an international agency. Is he prepared to go beyond this, as we are, so as to satisfy us, as we will satisfy him, that there can be no evasions of the prohibition of atomic weapons?

If Mr. Vishinsky can answer these questions in the affirmative then this debate will have taken humanity a great step forward toward peace.

If he cannot so answer them, then we are rightly apprehensive. For we cannot depend on anyone's unverified word in these matters—nor do we ask others to accept our unproved pledge.

The peoples of all countries, and the governments of most countries, in which I certainly include my own, want disarmament. We want complete disarmament in the field of atomic weapons, and very substantial disarmament indeed in the field of conventional weapons. Yet we cannot disarm unilaterally. We learned in the 1930's that when democracies disarm, in the face of totalitarian dictators, they may encourage such dictators to commit aggression. Humanity learned also in the 1930's, that honeyed words and assurances of peaceful intentions from dictators are not enough. In the 1930's the world paid too much heed to such assurances, and the false sense of security thus engendered, proved to be the precursor of war.

We cannot afford to gamble with international security. We cannot afford to disregard the fear in men's hearts. That fear must be allayed not by peace resolutions, but by peace policies, on the part of *all* great nations.

That is why we seek to link the prohibition of atomic weapons with the establishment of effective control. That is why we link the question of reducing conventional armaments with proposals to establish methods of inspection and verification.

When Mr. Vishinsky rejects such effective controls, as he did last week in the Ad Hoc Committee, and when his representatives veto proposals for verification of armaments, as they did last month in the Security Council, we cannot help wondering at his motives.