

the national character, they contrived by making themselves useful to maintain their influence with the native powers to create a powerful combination amongst them which threatened destruction to the British interests.

Owing to the jealousy excited by the rapid acquisition of territory and power by the English East India Company, and the ill conduct combined with rapacity of its servants, a war had been provoked with the Wahrattas, a fine and warlike nation in Hindustan. Hyder Ally Cawn, the regent of the Mysore country, was at the same time engaged in hostilities with the latter, but by the management of the French in his service measures were found to compromise the differences, and, instead of being opponents, to join against the British, powerful succors being promised from the islands of Bourbon and Mauritius; so well and cleverly was this confederacy formed that the Soubah of the Decar and the Rajah of Berar with most of the lesser powers of Hindustan joined it, and in June, 1750, with 100,000 horsemen spread themselves over the plains of the Ciamatic. For a considerable time before this event intelligence of what was to happen was conveyed to the Madras Presidency but was treated with contemptuous indifference, and owing to this shameful negligence no defensive measures had been taken and the country was ravaged to the walls of Madras. At length when the combined army had laid siege to Arcot, within 95 miles of the capital, a force consisting of 1500 Europeans and 4200 Sepoys were collected with a train of artillery under the command of Sir Hector Munro was marched to Canjeveram, sixty miles from Madras, compelling Hyder Ally to raise the siege of Arcot. Having determined to halt here till joined by Col. Cosby with a detachment of 1500 Sepoys and some cavalry from the Tanjore country in the south, and by another detachment of 3000 men including two companies of European infantry and sixty artillerymen with ten field pieces under Colonel Baillie, coming from the Guntoor Circar in the north; this latter detachment had reached Punam baicum, within fifteen miles of Sir Hector Munro's head-quarters, were surprised by Hyder Ally's son Tippu Saib at the head of an overwhelming force, and after a night and day's hard fighting were cut to pieces, the officers surviving and a few European soldiers being saved for a prolonged captivity. This happened on the evening of the 9th Sept., 1750, and although Sir H. Munro knew that his detachment was in peril he took no steps to protect or relieve it till late next day when he arrived on the scene of action after all was over. Hyder Ally retreated immediately afterwards and Sir H. Munro returned to Canjeveram, whence, after spiking his heavy guns and destroying such parts of his baggage and stores as could not be conveniently moved, he returned to Madras being joined *en route* by Colonel Cosby's detachment.

The country was again by Munro's stupidity left open to the enemy who, reduced to Arcot, Caraugooly and Gungee with other posts, and were about to proceed to lay siege to Madras where confusion and disorganization reigned supreme.

At this juncture the Presidency of Bengal interfered, General Sir Eyre Cootte the Commander-in-Chief in India, took command of the Madras army with a seat in the Council, the President being suspended, having sailed from Calcutta with a force of 300 Europeans, 200 artillerymen and 500 lascars with artillery and ample stores, while ten battalions of Sepoys with 20 pieces of artillery were marched overland; and Sir Edward Hughes commanding the British fleet in the East Indies having undertaken to blockade the seaports of the coast of Malabar, thus intercepting the supplies from the Mauritius and Bourbon. The General was enabled early in 1781 to take the field with a well appointed army and compelled Hyder Ally to confine his ravages to a more limited extent of country—several of the posts taken by him were recovered—he was defeated in several battles and the Company's affairs in a great measure retrieved, and finally he was compelled to evacuate the Tangoro country,—his shipping was destroyed at Calicut and Mangalore and the Dutch fort of Negapatam garrisoned by 2300 of his soldiers was captured, thus closing the campaign of 1781 successfully.

The military student of the events of this contest will find great difficulty in understanding the exact objects sought to be attained by the invasion of South Carolina and the subsequent operations in North Carolina and Virginia—every foot of ground covered had to be retained by a sufficient force, and the invading army could claim no more of the country than the space within their lines; so evident was this in South Carolina that the loss of Major Ferguson's detachment obliged Lord Cornwallis to return from his expedition to North Carolina and fall back to Wynnborough in South Carolina—either indulging in self deception or being deceived by others as to the value of a movement into the Northern Province and the assumed certainty of being aided by the supposed loyal inhabitants induced Earl Cornwallis to ask for reinforcements which to the number of 1500 men under Gen. Leslie marched from Charleston on the 19th December, 1780. The junction of this detachment would leave the British General at liberty to move from Wynnborough with 3500 men after providing for all contingencies, and with this force the conquest of North Carolina was deemed a certainty.

General Greene who had succeeded Gen. Gates in the command of the American army finding it a matter of great difficulty to obtain a sufficient supply of provisions and his force being unequal to any attempt against the British army, resolved to divide it into small and easily managed detachments and by operating in different directions distract

the attention of the British General or compel him to a similar system of tactics by which the different divisions of the invading army would be easily overpowered and cut up in detail by means similar to those employed against the late Major Ferguson's detachment,—and this would be fatal because there were no reserves to fall back on while a defeat to the American forces was easily repaired the whole country being actively or passively committed to their cause.

The regular troops of Congress under Gen. Greene's command did not exceed 1400 men, but his force was capable of sudden expansion by the accession of the militia of the Province, and these were by no means as contemptible troops as the writers on the events of this war civil and military are wont to describe; on the contrary, much of the checks received during this invasion of North Carolina is due to militia more than to the superior steadiness or discipline of the regular troops of Congress—and thus can be easily understood from the fact that all the actions were fought in *the bush*, the ground being more or less wooded and unfit for elaborate operations—the militia knowing every inch of the ground fought generally under cover, and when forced to action almost always overlapped the flanks of the advancing troops doing infinite mischief and suffering very little. With a foe of this description it was particularly difficult to deal, especially as through the country people ample opportunities were afforded of imposing on the British General with false information and leading him into positions of great difficulty; in fact the very first operation of the second invasion of North Carolina amply illustrated the peculiar dangers to which the advancing army would be subjected.

Towards the end of December intelligence was conveyed to the Earl of Cornwallis that General Greene had made a division of his troops, the light infantry and Colonel Washington's dragoons being placed under the command of General Morgan, with orders to pass the Catawba and Broad Rivers, collect the militia of the districts through which he marched and afterwards threaten the British post at Ninety Six, which was reckoned of more importance to the safety of Charleston and the retention of North Carolina than its local position warranted. The remainder of his troops under his own command were marched to Halley's ferry, on the Pedee, for the purpose of threatening the communications of the British troops with Camden.

On the 1st January, 1781, Lord Cornwallis ordered Tarleton, with his corps of cavalry and light infantry of 550 men, the first Battalion of the 71st Regt. of 200 men and two three pounders, to cross Broad River force Morgan to an action or compel him to re-pass the river—these orders were reiterated next day and he was enjoined to push the American General to the utmost—with the characteristic energy which always distinguished him Colonel Tarleton instantly put his force in