

Much is disclosed about modern negotiating techniques and diplomatic practice. For example: "... even when representatives were acting under instructions, they sometimes pretended that they were expressing only their personal views" (48). "... Lovett said it had been agreed that the results of the meeting would not be reported to the respective governments. Lovett nonetheless reported the results of the meeting to his government. Presumably all the other participants did likewise" (56). "In December of 1948 the Ambassadors' Committee agreed to mislead the public. They decided that the draft treaty and commentary prepared by the Permanent Commission of the Brussels powers should not be presented to the Ambassadors' Committee in any form, and that it should be given to the Working Group not 'as a complete document' but as 'proposals item by item' . . . This would make it possible for the participants to say that they had not received a draft treaty" (74). "Governments had agreed in July not to refer to the discussions in telegrams or over the telephone. Yet there was a voluminous exchange of telegrams between the Canadian Embassy in Washington and the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa about the discussions; and Pearson and Wrong had many talks about them over the telephone" (75).

These attempts to mislead both publics and fellow delegates were caused in part by the ultra-secrecy in which (so all but one participant assumed) the negotiation was held. The author devotes a chapter to a sophisticated discussion of secret diplomacy, noting the "paradox . . . that, while knowledge of the tripartite talks of March 1948 was kept from the public and from friendly governments, it was not kept from the Soviet Government". A member of the inner circle of the 15 persons "in the know" was Donald McLean - British diplomat, Soviet agent. (It is this reviewer's impression, derived from his own work in the files, that McLean, who remained on the inside of the negotiations until September 1948, was entrusted by the rest with the important task of keeping the minutes or the "agreed record" - which, if true, would certainly have eased his other important task of reporting to the Kremlin.

The author shrewdly observes that McLean's Soviet connection was not necessarily disadvantageous to the West. It would have been so had the negotiation ended in failure, for in that event Moscow would have had much material with which to stir up discord and disarray among

Western governments and publics. But, as things turned out, "his presence may well have been advantageous for the West. In his reports to Moscow, he presumably informed the Soviet Government that no one in the top-secret discussions evinced any desire to embark on a preventive strike against the Soviet Union while the United States still had a monopoly of the atomic bomb" (80). This rendered useful service. If Soviet agents who penetrate the arcane counsels of the West did not exist, there are occasions when it would be necessary to invent them.

The author makes one imaginative suggestion: "The Soviet Government would make a great contribution to an understanding of the Cold War if it were to publish Donald McLean's reports to them on the making of the North Atlantic Treaty" (81). Not bloody likely.

The negotiators took extraordinary precautions against the artillery of the press and, with one exception, there were no leaks. The exception was caused by James Reston of the *New York Times*, whose "buddy system" approach to journalism had earned him the confidence of the inner circle to the point where he joined it as an honorary member. In November 1948 and again in February 1949, Reston "made proposals privately to the participants for the incorporation in the treaty of a provision of special military agreements . . ." (73). Perhaps annoyed that the treaty was not turning out just the way he wanted, Reston so far forgot himself as to publish "an accurate story of the differences of opinion between the negotiating governments over the wording of the pledge"; the story appeared in the *Times* on February 10. The leak disturbed Pearson: "Now that the precise differences have been made public in the press," Reid wrote then of his chief's reaction, "he feels that the time may have come when he will have to discuss these difficulties with his colleagues in Cabinet." Heaven forbid.

There was a price to be paid for such lone-ranger diplomacy, and the author tells us what it was: "... Ministers became involved in the decision-making process who knew little or nothing of the policies which Canada had pursued in the negotiations . . . This was one reason why, after the treaty was signed, the Canadian Government was half-hearted over implementing those non-military provisions of the treaty for which it had fought so hard during the negotiations" (86). The main opponent of Article 2 proved to be not Dean Acheson, U.S.

*Sophisticated
discussion
of secret
diplomacy*