

imposition upon Quebec of a policy which his political friends had taught Quebec to detest. He would have remembered that a cold douche upon a super-heated substance may cause explosion, and that super-heated men are more explosive than metals. He might, indeed, have inaugurated an attempt to undo all that had been done in Quebec. But that would have been a slow process. And meanwhile he would have most properly declared that—

“HAVING ENLISTED BY VOLUNTARY METHODS OVER 400,000 MEN, I WILL NOT DISRUPT CANADA IN ORDER THAT I MAY SEND BY COMPULSION A FEW THOUSAND MORE.”

Separated from the actualities of Canadian life, Sir Robert allowed himself to be swept away by the sentimental and the spectacular, whereas in Canada he would have retained his touch with the real, the practical, and the valuable. Until early in February of the present year, when he left Ottawa, he saw no necessity for conscription. When in London he saw, if possible, less: for on April 6 the United States entered the war. And yet he determined to enforce conscription in Canada.

Very obviously, the only reason for his change of attitude was that he had ceased to think along Canadian lines. He had assumed towards Canada, for the moment, the attitude of a Joseph Chamberlain or a Winston Churchill. And if any one thinks that that explanation of the genesis of conscription in Canada is improbable, I agree, but I ask him two questions:

1. What other explanation is possible?
2. Is there any better explanation of all the other extraordinary things that Sir Robert did in London?

WHAT SIR ROBERT OUGHT AND OUGHT NOT TO HAVE DONE.

What Sir Robert ought, and ought not, to have done is very clear:

1. He ought to have dissociated himself and his party from the Nationalist propaganda in 1910. But he did not.
2. When Sir George Foster, Mr. Barker, and others were sending assistance to the Nationalist candidate in Drummond-Arthabaska,