

nies? They are, on the other hand, wholly exposed to the French from the Mississippi, particularly all the Over-hill towns?

We have already experienced the difficulty of passing those mountains, and attacking the Indians: but their settlements being chiefly spread along the banks of the Cherokee River, and its branches, might not the French, by the easy navigation thereof, disembark, and attack them in the very heart of their country, without any of the inconveniences attending a land march? Have we not the greatest reason possible to secure the confidence of these Indians on the back of our southern colonies, when they have hitherto been esteemed the only barrier to our colonies on that side against the designs of the French; a barrier, Sir, the more important, as those colonies are intirely unable to defend themselves in our whole security hitherto has depended, and, while the French have any settlement on the Mississippi, must always depend on the good inclinations towards us. But can we expect this while the the French have any settlement on the Mississippi? Can we hereafter expect to enjoy a union of them in our interests, when it will be so inconsistent with common sense, and, perhaps, their natural inclinations?

But, let us farther suppose that, at a futrue negociation we should not only require the absolute cession of Canada, but insist likewise that the French should confine themselves to the westward of the Mississippi, and leave us the whole south and east territory to the very banks of that river, including the great rivers Illinois and Ohio. Would even this extraordinary cession secure us against the future inconveniences of war, against encroachments,  
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