

*External Affairs*

limitation on nuclear weapons, and by that I mean a mutual limitation under supervision. There also might be considered agreed arrangements for gradual and mutual armed force reductions and comprehensive security guarantees for the countries of both eastern and western Europe. This is not to say, of course, when I give this partial catalogue, that Canada has taken a firm position or a fixed position on any specific measure as yet. They could be considered as general objectives. I would hope that these and others would be considered at a ministerial meeting of some NATO powers or the occupying NATO powers to be held about the middle of March. I repeat, and I say it seriously, that we should not have a negative approach, but at the same time we should have clear objectives in respect to a settlement of these topics to which I have referred. Every proposal, however, must be considered in the light of certain aims and objectives which are basic to western interests. Among these I mention again the freedom of the two and a half million people in Berlin. We cannot compromise their situation. We must look toward attaining, with safeguards, and with some advances in terms of European security, the restoration of a free Germany in a free and untrammelled Europe. No proposal, Mr. Speaker, should be accepted which would have the effect of changing the balance of military security to the disadvantage of the west.

At this part of my contribution to this debate I must say quite frankly that it is distressing that John Foster Dulles, the United States secretary of state, should have been stricken by illness. All members of the house will join with me in wishing for him a speedy and complete recovery. I salute him as a man who has devoted his public career, in that high office of secretary of state of the United States, to the pursuit of an honourable agreement between the east and the west. I express my own admiration of his qualities of fortitude and courage. I can report to the house, Mr. Speaker, that his recent visit to London, Paris and Bonn, just before he was taken to hospital, helped materially in co-ordinating the western views, in identifying basic western interests to be protected, and in making clear the objectives to be pursued in any negotiations with the Soviet union.

Having mentioned Mr. Dulles and it is not by way of formality but out of the depth of sincerity that I must say that we applaud the current visit of Mr. Macmillan, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, to the Soviet union. It might appear that he has had something of a mixed reception, but for us his visit could be a most significant development,

[Mr. Smith (Hastings-Frontenac).]

providing as it does a timely opportunity for Mr. Macmillan to make it clear to the Soviet leaders that the western countries are genuinely interested in a search for common ground but that they do not intend to be intimidated by the belligerence which often characterizes statements coming from the U.S.S.R.

Prime Minister Macmillan has made it clear in the United Kingdom and to his NATO allies that he is not in Russia for the purpose of negotiating, but that he is there rather to exchange views and to work toward a better understanding on both sides of opposing points of view. I am sure all members of the house are confident of his ability to do that and perhaps more. He carries with him today our best wishes for the success of his visit.

That sense of well-wishing, for me anyway, has been intensified recently—indeed on February 24—by reason of a speech made by Mr. Khrushchev to a political gathering in the Kremlin. I have studied the press reports of the speech, and that is all I have at the moment. I have studied them carefully and at least I can say this. I recognize in that speech the standard Soviet position on questions relating to Germany and Berlin. Although this speech may be discouraging—and I do not think I am running the risk of being Pollyanna-ish—I still want to see what will be the formal reply by the U.S.S.R. to the notes that were recently sent to Moscow. I am thinking of the series of notes which I identify by the date of our own note, namely February 17. I think the western powers should be guided more by whatever the tenor of that formal response may be than by the remarks made by Mr. Khrushchev at a political gathering.

As the western powers approach—and I say this very definitely—what could be a fateful new effort at negotiation with the Soviet union, it is opportune to look at other fields of endeavour where we have been negotiating with the U.S.S.R. on important matters. I speak of the two conferences. One was to have started last autumn in Geneva. One of the conferences had to do with the cessation of nuclear tests; the other had to do with setting up some machinery or technique against surprise attack.

For a moment let us look at the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. That is an objective for which the whole of mankind must pray. The disarmament commission and under it the disarmament sub-committee, which was set up by the United Nations really came to an end at the end of 1957. The Soviet leaders said they would not participate in any further discussions in the disarmament