

This considered move towards a more independent position in foreign policy led by way of a good deal of reflection to a number of important conclusions. The Government looked at Canadian membership in military alliances, when the era of military confrontation was obviously fading. We decided that our membership still stood us in good stead, although the form of Canada's contribution had to change with the times. This decision has permitted Canada to remain a full participant in the moves since 1968 toward a relaxation of tension in Europe. It will permit us next year to take part in bringing about conferences on co-operation and security in Europe, and on the mutual and balanced reduction of the opposing military forces in Europe which have symbolized the era of confrontation. These will be the first general negotiations affecting European security in more than a generation. Canada's basic interests are involved. We have earned our right to a voice in the outcome through our European role during the Second World War, and through faithful and constructive adherence to the North Atlantic Alliance since.

The Government looked also at our relations with the Soviet Union and China. These too were ripe for change, and important changes duly followed. In the case of the Soviet Union, the new mood was embodied in a Protocol on Consultations - an agreement to talk. This ensures that, however much we disagree, we go on talking regularly with the Soviet Union over the complete range of our shared interests. This dialogue is pursued to the highest levels, as when the Prime Minister visited the Soviet Union and Mr. Kosygin visited Canada. In the case of China, the change has been even more dramatic: after almost two years of negotiating, Canada recognized the People's Republic of China in 1970. We played a leading part in bringing Peking into the United Nations in the following year. As with the Soviet Union, we have created a framework within which we can talk steadily and seriously to a powerful country which otherwise, to our great cost, we might badly misunderstand. Furthermore, we have created new means for securing key Canadian interests - notably a permanent place for our wheat in China and the Soviet Union, now our two largest foreign grain markets. In the process of transforming our relations with China and the Soviet Union, we have done ourselves good and we have done the international community some good as well. Other countries - notably the United States - have followed much the same path since; Canada has not had to buy new friendships at the expense of old ones.

The review of foreign policy led to other changes as well: to increases in the quantity and improvements in the quality of Canadian assistance to the developing countries; to much closer Canadian involvement in the concerns and institutions of this hemisphere; to more vigorous expression of Canada's bilingual and multicultural nature abroad. And the Government conducted a unique experiment in communication, in order to identify the aims and themes of Canadian foreign policy, to explain its intentions, and to encourage public discussion. This experiment was launched with the publication of a summary of the foreign policy review, not in tomes for the reference shelf of a library, but in the form of a set of six pamphlets, each no more than 30 or 40 pages long. These pamphlets appeared in June, 1970, under the title "Foreign Policy for Canadians". Together with the article on Canada-U. S. Relations about which I now wish to speak, they constitute a comprehensive review of the main currents in Canadian foreign policy. They are designed to take the mystery out of a policy field that is often and