

We must, then, develop an imaginative yet realistic diplomacy, one based on a clear and unclouded understanding of the intentions and methods of the Soviet Union and its satellites and of their strengths and weaknesses; one based also on a staunch adherence to our own policies and principles.

There is now less reason for complacency on our part than ever, for the threat to the institutions and the society of the free world remains as strong as ever. There is, however, no reason for despair merely because Mr. Molotov said "Nyet" at Geneva and because Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev continue to level harsh and unfounded accusations at the western powers, mixed with honeyed words and offers of peace pacts. The latest of these offers was made the other day to the government of the United States through a message from Mr. Bulganin to President Eisenhower. I feel that I am voicing the impressions of most members of this House, though I know I should speak only for myself, when I say that I have read with admiration and respect the reply of the President of the United States to that offer. It was constructive not negative, and it was the sort of attitude that in a matter of this kind I am sure this government would be happy to support.

I have already mentioned the feeling of confidence and self-assurance of the Soviet leaders. If on our part we can show strength, steadiness and unity—a strength which is more than military, a steadiness which is not indifference and a unity which is based on common ideals and which requires careful and continuous fostering—we shall prove the communists wrong in their assurance that the future belongs to them.

If we do not, we shall have only ourselves to blame.

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