

Mr. Dulles embarked on a six-week trip to Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, in the course of which an opportunity was provided for a useful exchange of views with allied and Japanese leaders alike, on the terms of a treaty which would have some hope of acceptance. Canadian officials were in constant touch with the Department of State during this period and were kept fully informed of the progress being made in the negotiations.

In March of this year a tentative United States draft of a peace treaty for Japan was given to the Canadian Government. It was the first of a series of drafts upon which the views of interested governments were exchanged. It is important to note that succeeding drafts were given to the Soviet Union and that on a number of occasions Mr. Dulles met Mr. Malik to discuss these drafts. Although spokesmen for the U.S.S.R. have denied that any exchange of views took place, Mr. Dulles countered this denial at San Francisco, pointing out that the two Governments had exchanged ten memoranda and drafts. A near final draft, sponsored jointly by the United States and United Kingdom Governments, was given on July 3 to the group of governments, including Canada, which were considered to have a special concern in the treaty. Further revisions were made in the draft text as a result of the comments of interested governments and the final text was circulated on August 13. The United States Government, on July 21, issued a formal invitation to all Governments which were at war with Japan to participate in "a conference for conclusion and signature of a treaty of peace with Japan". In the invitation the text to be circulated on August 13 was described as a "final text".

The treaty therefore was negotiated by diplomatic rather than conference methods. It was to be signed at San Francisco, not renegotiated as the Communist Delegations attempted to do. They failed to muster any support in their attempts because non-Communist Delegations were well aware that it was the obstructive, delaying tactics of Communist Governments which had made necessary the negotiation of the treaty through diplomatic channels.

The unusual nature of the Conference, therefore, is evident but what is so unusual about the treaty? Examination of the terms of the treaty will convince any reasonable person that reconciliation and not revenge is its main goal. It is a generous treaty restoring Japan's sovereignty and placing no restrictions on her economy or on her ability to defend herself. The Allied Powers recognize in the treaty that Japan should in principle pay reparations for the devastation and suffering she caused during the war. However, they recognize in addition that Japan lacks the physical capacity to recompense her war-time victims if at the same time she is to achieve a viable economy and contribute to the economic health of the Pacific area. No one can guarantee that the "peace of reconciliation" will succeed. However, experience has shown that harsh and restrictive treaties have within them the seeds of their own destruction.

The Canadian Government's preference for the type of treaty that was signed this month is not a recent preference. In an address to the House of Commons on February 22, 1950, the Secretary of State for External Affairs expressed the hope that "at least one major problem may soon be erased from our slate of problems in the Pacific". He went on: