

Agency (ISMA). Other elements in the discussion included an overview of the UNCIAD infrastructure, an estimate of operating expenses, and a provisional look at terms and conditions for UNCIAD duties. On balance, a strong case was made for the development of an UNCIAD-style multilateral image collection and distribution system.

The third paper in the morning session, "The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea: A Case Study in Monitoring Arms Control" by Dr. Robert Bedeski, explored the problems that had beset the Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission (NNSC) from its very inception at the close of the Korean War. As a function of the Armistice Agreement, the NNSC ostensibly was to ensure that the armistice was not used to prepare for another war. Composed of members from four states — two true neutrals (Switzerland and Sweden) and two non-participants in the Korean War (Poland and Czechoslovakia) — the NNSC was to be engaged in three distinct types of verification enterprise. These included fixed inspection teams at five sea ports in the North and the South; challenge inspections; and the management of full reports on the replacement of men and equipment in the North and the South.

The NNSC was a good example of how not to design and manage a monitoring system. It had no authority of its own to conduct effective inspections, no real capacity to observe or punish violations, and its inspection team approach was badly conceived. Dr. Bedeski observed that the NNSC experience highlighted the impossibility of developing a meaningful monitoring system when a principal participant does not want it to function successfully. As well, a monitoring system that has no recourse to durable and reliable sanctions could not keep the parties from misbehaving with impunity. Although a more comprehensive system — one with the capacity to send inspectors to any suspect site or event — might have helped in principle, the unwillingness of North Korea to be a meaningful participant would have doomed any monitoring efforts to failure. The NNSC experience also demonstrated the great importance of true neutrals in managing an unbiased monitoring system and illustrated the mischief that insincere or dishonest inspectors could make.

It was interesting to speculate how the NNSC, as an existing body, might be revised in order to function more effectively in the future. A change in the attitude of North Korea might permit this existing entity to undertake a meaningful monitoring role if the security relationship between North and South Korea entered a new, more positive phase in the near future. The historical failure of the NNSC by no means meant that it would never play a useful role in overseeing the transformation of Korean security relations.

The last of the morning paper presentations was by Mr. James Macintosh. "Confidence-Building Evolution in Europe: Static or Portable" presented an introduction to the confidence building