

political decision making by definition are largely restricted to one or two functional levels and are dealt within a single part of the paper. Others such as finance spread across all four levels and will be split between chapters: e.g., Chapter 8 for political/strategic finances, and Chapter 11 for operational/tactical finances.

Some peace-keeping issues have been left out as largely peripheral to rapid reaction per se. This includes end of mission assessments ² or reviews designed to amass lessons learned. Those lessons are critical in the long range development and improvement of all parts of peace-keeping including rapid reaction, but will not be discussed in this paper.

It should also be noted that all Secretariat UN peace-keeping ³ sectors are the object of this study, but DPKO is the responsibility centre for most of what is being discussed. In this regard, the recent rapid growth of DPKO ⁴ has already resolved some previous UN peace-keeping shortcomings. This has been driven both internally, and externally by TCNs ⁵ who have provided substantial advice and guidance along with staff on loan. Furthermore, DPKO is still in a state of flux as duties and responsibilities are firmed up and the working relationships normalize.

Even relatively mundane issues such as office space and physical dispersion of DPKO and related parts of the Secretariat must be resolved to maximize the output and speed of reaction of the "new" DPKO. Staffs are often jammed into small and at times dysfunctional work spaces, with key officers sometimes sharing common cramped offices. In addition, DPKO is spread through a variety of floors within the UN Secretariat main tower, in various offices across the road in the old UNITAR building, and in another set of offices down the road at 866 UN Plaza (Alcoa building). This dispersal is equally dysfunctional and must be addressed.

Another process that is unfolding is the coordination of DHA, DPKO and DPA activities in planning and implementing complex operations in the field (see Chapter 2). This enhanced coordination, which has only

² This step is part of the DHA/DPKO/DPA Coordination Plan see annex 6, and has just been done for the Somalia mission.

³ This report was not designed to look at the emergency preparedness structures of non-peace-keeping UN activities, but it is clear that DPKO and others are at least tangentially aware of processes elsewhere in the system. UNHCR for example has an emergency response coordinator with three teams that are on permanent standby. UNHCR buttresses this with standby arrangements with organizations like UNICEF, WFP, the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils, the Swedish Rescue Services Board, Redde Barne, and UN Volunteers. UNHCR has limited vehicle and equipment stockpiles, and has started to build upon the successful concept of "services packages" developed during the Rwandan crisis. Examination of UNHCR's and other UN crisis reaction mechanisms might indicate valuable options for the development of peace-keeping rapid reaction.

⁴ During the years 1992 to 1994, DPKO staff multiplied almost 10 fold with over 320 on staff at present. Some of the changes include a new Office of Operations, a new Office of Planning and Support, Situation Centre April 1993, Policy & Analysis Unit late 1993, new Mission Planning Service, FALD moved from DAM to DPKO Sept. 1993, Electoral Assistance unit moved from DPA, Demining Unit 1992, CivPol Unit 1993, Training Unit 1992, logistics base in Brindisi, and a broad variety of logistics/financial reviews.

⁵ The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (Committee of 34) has come up with a number of recommendations, and Canada chairs its working group.