

At the same time, the psychological and political effects of a unilateral withdrawal "would have a disproportionate impact on the morale of the other members," and would "be interpreted as an acceptance of the inevitability of the breakup of NATO."<sup>24</sup> The political aspects of Canada's role can not be rejected as easily as the anti-NATO group would like, since the political benefits accrued from the alliance are substantial.

Internationalists such as John Holmes admit that our alignment has been both a "factor of strength and also...a handicap." But, on the whole, the alliance system "has given us influence where the great decisions are made—not much perhaps, but more at least than most middle powers can command."<sup>25</sup>

The staunchest supporter of interdependence as a means of gaining influence, however, has been Peyton Lyon, and the problem of achieving influence is a central theme of The Policy Question. "The soundest Canadian policy is to seek to influence world affairs primarily (but not exclusively) through the exploitation of our standing in Washington and in NATO." Furthermore, "being a partner in good standing of this organization (NATO) accounts for a considerable portion of Canada's ability to influence the course of international affairs."<sup>26</sup> While the revisionists argue NATO restricts Canadian participation in other foreign policy areas, the traditionalists take just the opposite position. "There is reason to believe that the non-aligned have taken us much more seriously, because we are a country which they think has the ear of Washington and London, then they would have done if we floated free."<sup>27</sup> In the area of mediation<sup>28</sup> Canada does not seem to have suffered as a result of NATO ties as the UN membership question in 1955, UNEF in 1957, and an active role in disarmament are good examples. Thus there seems to be little evidence to indicate that Canada could be any more effective in international politics if we were non-aligned, and this also applies to the present Vietnam situation. Nowhere does the above statement have greater applicability than in the area of peacekeeping. Rather than argue that the NATO and peacekeeping roles are incompatible, it is more logical, based on the number of operations in which Canada has participated, to argue that they are complementary. The high level of professionalism can largely be attributed to the NATO role and the training it provides for the Armed Forces.<sup>29</sup>

The relationship between a reduction in the defence budget (i.e., in effect opting out of NATO) and increased foreign assistance to the developing nations does, however, raise some interesting points. There is no doubt a reduction of \$1 billion in defence expenditures would see an increase in foreign assistance, and the revisionists would like to see aid become a major cornerstone of foreign policy. Traditionalists agree foreign aid should be increased, but at the same time they maintain the cornerstone of Canadian foreign must remain the North Atlantic area.<sup>30</sup> An obvious problem of priorities exists — the North Atlantic area, the developing areas, or both? Needless to say, this question is at the root of the entire discussion between the two groups of academics.

Since the traditionalist position explicitly accepts a policy of interdependence as the most effective, the question of subservience to the US never becomes that important an issue. Implicit in the acceptance of interdependence is surrender of a certain amount of sovereignty, and the important thing is to ensure this is offset by gains in other areas. Furthermore,