Again, the matter cannot be very important in the sense of frequently recurring as raised a quarter of a century ago, no case seems to have occurred again till the present.

Then, too, as there are two grounds upon which the judgment may be supported either of which is sufficient, it might happen as in the *Rainy River Case*, that the Court of Appeal would proceed on the ground taken by the learned Referee, and leave this point undecided.

But the objection to granting leave goes much deeper.

It would not profit the applicant at all to have a judgment in his favour reversing my decision, and holding that he is entitled to take advantage as a "creditor" of the Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgage Act, unless he could go further and succeed in convincing the Court of Appeal that the learned Referee was wrong in holding that the bills of sale in the present case satisfies the statute.

The plain fact is that the liquidator is saying: "The navigation company are not entitled to hold the property because their solicitors made a mistake in drawing up the documents—my solicitors made a mistake in not going to the Court of Appeal—help me by enabling my solicitors to take advantage of the mistake of the other solicitors by nullifying theirs."

It is the proverbial rule of fair play "If you can't help the man, do not help the bear." And it would, in my view, be monstrous for the Court to assist one litigant to take advantage of a slip of his opponent by lifting him over a slip of his own.

Whatever advantage any litigant can derive from a statute, he must have—the Court cannot mitigate the vigour of a statute, however great injustice it may work in the particular instance. "The words of the Legislature are the text of the law and must be obeyed," see Hamilton, J., [1911] 1 K. B. at p. 1101. The Legislature can legislate only in general terms, and every general rule will work hardship in particular cases—but with that the Court has nothing to do. "The statute is like a tyrant; where he comes, he makes all void," said Hobart, C.J., according to Twisden, C.J., in *Maleverer* v. *Redshaw* (1670), 1 Mod. 36, and Wilmot, C.J., in *Collins* v. *Blantern* (1767), 2 Wils. 351. No one can withstand that tyrant when he attacks; but when all danger of an attack is over, it is a matter for the sound discretion of the Court whether the tyrant is to be called back and empowered to make an attack. In the present case