

guard, at the distance she was, immediately the fog came on. The *Vanguard* would have been likely to hear the gun fired from the flagship after the fog came on. She would, therefore, be aware of her being out of station astern.

The President: Would the captains of ships in the squadron, being informed by the admiral that he intended to proceed at a speed of seven or eight knots, and the fog coming on without any signal being made indicating reduced speed in the flagship, be justified in parting company from the admiral during a fog, and in so doing would they be justified by Articles 2 and 7 of the fog signal instructions?

Admiral Tarleton: Under the circumstances I consider that they would have been justified in parting company. The cruise of the squadron had virtually terminated. Three ships had already been detached. Queenstown was the last port we had to call at, and I anticipated that in the event of parting company they would rejoin the following day.

The President: It has been stated in evidence that immediately before the fog came on the *Iron Duke* was three cables distant astern of the *Vanguard*. Ought she to have been two cables distant? Witness: She ought to have been two.

The President: If the *Iron Duke* had been in her station with reference to the *Vanguard* when the fog came on, looking at the fact that communication was maintained between the flagship and the *Hector* the whole way to Queenstown by steam whistle, could she have maintained a knowledge of the position of the *Vanguard* during the same time by use of the same means?

Admiral Tarleton replied in the affirmative. In reply to the question as to whether he considered that the signal staff was sufficient as to numbers and efficiency for the purposes of evolution on board the ships of his squadron, and whether he had reason to doubt the sufficiency in that respect of the *Vanguard* and the *Iron Duke*, the witness said the ships were differently officered as to the signal arrangements from the fleet, inasmuch as there was no sub lieutenants; otherwise the signals were, as a rule, properly obeyed, and the staff in the *Warrior* under the fog lieutenant was good.

The President: It has been stated in evidence that when the *Vanguard* reduced speed from eight knots to 6.5, and, for a short time, to 3½ knots, it was not known to those in charge of the ship how a signal could easily be made to the *Iron Duke* by the steam whistle stating they had reduced speed. Is there any difficulty that you know of in making the signal by steam whistle, taken out of the signal book, "Reduce speed of engines"?

Witness replied that there was no difficulty; it only required practice. No seaman would be fit for the position of signalman in charge on board a vessel like the *Vanguard* if he could not make that signal by steam whistle. As the principle was the same as that of the flashing signals, he should be competent to signalise with the steam whistle. So far as his experience went, the existing signal books and instructions of naval service in respect to the conducting of fleets were sufficient to meet all the requirements under all circumstances. He had noticed no apparent slackness or incapacity on the part of the signal department in the *Vanguard* and the *Iron Duke*, and especially on the 1st of September.

In reply to Admiral Chamberlain, he said that he inspected the *Vanguard* on the 6th of August last, and was particularly satisfied of her condition for war and of her condition

in general, and so reported to the Admiralty. Captain Dawkins called his attention to the subject of the water tight compartments on his going around the ship, and informed him that he had established a system by which all the water tight doors might be immediately closed. He did not test this report by ordering that duty to be done in his presence.

The President: Did you observe during your inspection of the *Vanguard* whether the regulations as to watertight doors and valves being periodically examined were carried out?—I asked the question of the captain, and he informed me that they had. I do not remember any complaint was made to me as to the efficiency of the doors and valves.

By Captain Dawkins: I have a general impression that you called my attention to the importance of having some bugle call to close up at once all the watertight compartments of the ship, but I do not remember the exact manner in which you did so.

Captain Whyte was called, and deposed to the firing of the guns as stated in Admiral Tarleton's evidence. In answer to a question, he said: Knowing the density of the fog I do not think it possible that the *Vanguard* and the *Iron Duke* could have come into collision without the *Iron Duke* hearing the *Vanguard's* steam whistle if properly sounded. He should calculate it must have been heard, taking the fog into consideration, and assuming the steam whistle to be similar to the *Hector's* at a distance of not more than four cables. They found when the *Hector* was keeping her station two cables apart her steam whistle sounded at the distance not very clearly. In reply to Captain Dawkins, who asked at any time before the collision he heard the *Vanguard* sounding her pennants in answer to the *Warrior's* and also whether he heard a steam cowl in the direction of the *Vanguard* blowing off, or received any report of such sounds being heard, witness said he did not, nor was it reported to him. It was not reported in the signal book.

Admiral Sir J. Tarleton was then recalled, at his own desire, to explain that when he said that discretion was left to the captains as to the speed they should go in a fog, this discretion was only allowed to the captain leading a column.

On Tuesday the first witness called was Flag Lieutenant Edward Stratford Dugdale, of the *Warrior*, who was minutely examined as to the signals. In reply to Captain Lethbridge, witness said that on the first appearance of the fog he went to the flag captain and asked him about reducing speed because of the fog. He did not make any suggestion to the vice admiral or the flag captain of the advisability of reducing speed to enable the *Vanguard* to come up to her station, although the fog was coming on, and the *Vanguard* was one mile distant on the port quarter. He had not time to do so, the fog coming down before the signal could be made with flags. At 1.15, when the signal was made to the *Hector* by flags "reduce speed of engines," signals could, he should think, be made out at a distance of about two miles. Finding that the *Vanguard* was not in signal distance, a signal could not, he thought, have been made to her by guns to reduce speed of engines. No signal guns had previously been heard from the port column, and for this reason he did not think a gun signal from the *Warrior* would have been practicable. Charges of 10lb. were being used in the *Warrior*, he believed, and the gun was trained on the port beam when fired.

Captain Lethbridge: You have stated and

you have reported in the signal log as having heard guns at different times that afternoon. You also stated that they were probably fired from a lightship or from the shore. At what distance do you think those guns were?—I have no idea.

John Davis, the signalman of the *Vanguard*, and Robert Martin, yeoman of signals on the same vessel, were then examined, and they both stated that the steam whistle of the *Vanguard* was blown during the fog, but that no signals were heard from the *Iron Duke*. Replying to the president, who inquired whether the witness had been asked if there was any way of making a signal to the *Iron Duke* to reduce speed or to let her know that the *Vanguard's* speed had been reduced, Martin said: I do not remember the question being put to me to know if I could make a signal, but I believe the captain asked me a question by which I understood that he wanted to make an instantaneous signal, such as we used by day—viz., the steam cowl—and I replied that I knew of none; but I suggested making our pennants to show our position. Witness, continuing his evidence in reply to the president, said the exact words of the captain, as far as he could remember, were, "Will continually blowing on the steam whistle show that we are reducing speed?" If he had been asked whether there was a signal that could be made by the steam whistle in a minute to reduce the speed of the engines, he thought he should not have been able to tell Captain Dawkins that it could easily have been done. The signal to reduce the speed of the engines is one of three figures. Before that signal could be made, it would require a distinguishing signal of the division addressed of four short sounds and two long on the steam whistle, and the signal itself to reduce would require three short and one long. There being a fog, he thought the preparative would not be sufficient before making the signal itself, because by making the preparative they should probably be mistaken for the Admiral's ship. If they made the signal without the divisional signal he thought it would not be in accordance with the Signal Instructions, Articles 8 and 9. It would take about two minutes to make the signal, as he thought it ought to be made under the circumstances of the *Vanguard*—"Reduce speed of engines"—that was, for it to be thoroughly understood. He did not know of any more rapid means of telling the ships astern that they had reduced speed or stopped the engines.

Robert Martin was recalled when the court reassembled on Wednesday, and stated that the *Iron Duke* was seen coming through the fog at forty yards' distance, and at that moment the steam whistle of the *Vanguard* was sounding.

In reply to Captain Edge, witness said that when Captain Dawkins asked him about signals in a fog he did not suggest gun signals. From the time the fog became thick to the time of the collision there would not have been sufficient time to load and fire guns to indicate the *Vanguard's* reduced speed.

Alfred Smith, gunner of the second class, and George Sparks, private in the Marines on board the *Vanguard*, were then examined, but their evidence disclosed no new features.

Commander Tandy, of the *Vanguard*, said he had prepared a statement regarding the stations the officers and men in the *Vanguard* ought to have gone to after the collision on the 1st of September. He had also prepared a list of doors of the watertight compartments and the names of the men