small"; and that criminals in this Dominion find, as a rule, that "the way of transgressors is hard." This knowledge moreover has a greater terror for criminals than even the cruelty and promptitude of lynch law, which happily has not taken root in this country.

We have more than once called the attention of the Ontario practitioner to the necessity of closing the pleadings against non-appearing defendants, in cases where judgment has to be obtained against them by motion. Those who are acquainted with the old Chancery practice find no difficulty in following the new practice, but there are some who seem to find it hard to understand it. The principle involved is after all very simple—whenever the case is of such a nature that under the Rules a motion for judgment is necessary as against a non-appearing defendant, then such defendant must be served with the statement of claim and if he fails to put in a defence the pleadings must be noted closed as against him, and he is then, under Rule 586, to be deemed to admit all the statements of fact made in the statement of claim; and, the plaintiff, on the case coming on for trial against the other defendants, if any, is then in a position to ask for judgment pro confesso as against the defendant as to whom the pleadings have been noted closed. In order to prevent cases being brought to trial before they are in a proper state to be heard as against all parties, the judges made a regulation directing officers passing records to certify as to the state of the cause against non-appearing defendants; but it is one thing to make regulations, and another to get them carried out. Solicitors who do not wish to get into difficulty with their cases would do well to be careful to see that the regulation is observed, and not enter cases for trial until the cause is ready to be heard as against all parties.

In reference to the question of security for costs in libel suits, which came up in *Neil* v. *Norman* (ante pp. 315, 316) a correspondent kindly informs us that the learned Judge, who overruled the decision of His Honour Judge Ermatinger in that case, relied on the judgment in *Egan* v. *Miller*, decided by the Common Pleas Divisional Court in November, 1887. In that case the Court upheld the decision of Armour, C.J., that a casual correspondent of a newspaper sued for libel contained in a letter published in a news-