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offered" by Messrs. Baldwin and Hincks; but their "best evidence" in this case does not deserve even the name of evidence.

Now, during the week of their resignation, the late Councilors might have found—as I have reason to believe they did find—that the House would not sustain them in any attempt to extract even an understanding, much less a formal "stipulation", as to the terms upon which the administration should in future be conducted. They therefore found it necessary to place themselves upon as strong ground as possible in respect to this point. Hence when it was pressed upon them, they made a virtue of necessity, and agreed to support a general resolution expressing their "desire" as to what "should be," and should not be; and this "negative" disclaimer of "desire" they now appeal to as the "best evidence that can be offered" as to what they had not done.

The statements of the late Councilors, and any inferences which those statements might authorise, would be entitled to the greatest respect under ordinary circumstances, and when no other parties but themselves were concerned; but when they adduce any statement of their own to commit the Representative of their Sovereign with having stated what was untrue, their professed evidence should be carefully sifted and weighed—under this process it is seen that their evidence, in the present case is in all respects, "found wanting."

Thus much then for their own evidence, or rather the absence of the very shadow of evidence in support of their assertion. Let us now consider the evidence in support of the Governor-General's statement.

In the first place then, what did Messrs. Baldwin and Lafontaine go to the Governor-General for? What did they go to him two days in succession for? Was it to resign? No.—Was it merely for advice? No. Was it not to make a demand? Was it not to come to an understanding as to the terms upon which they might "deem it prudent to continue in office?" And was not such a proceeding at variance with both the letter and spirit of Mr. Boulton's resolution, to which they appeal in their own justification? And does not such a proceeding go far to establish the truth of the Governor-General's statement?

That such was the object of their waiting upon his Excellency we have ample truth in the testimony of many of their own supporters, and even of themselves. Two witnesses and one fact will be sufficient on this preliminary point. Mr. Sullivan, in his explanatory speech, November 30, alleges "the impossibility (of himself and his colleagues) staying in office after understanding his Excellency's views." It appears then, that before understanding his Excellency's views it was possible for them to have remained in office; and that it was upon "his Excellency's views" that the late advisers resigned. And how come they to know his "views?" Why Messrs. Baldwin and Lafontaine went to ascertain them—views, which (as the concluding phrase of Mr. Boulton's resolution ex-

presses it) "*a due respect for the prerogative of the Crown, and proper constitutional delicacy towards her Majesty's Representative, FORBID THEIR BEING EXPRESSED.*" Again, the Editor of the *Examiner*—one of the secretaries of the Toronto Association—has the following words and italics: "When waited upon by Mr. Lafontaine, in behalf of himself and colleagues, in order that they might come to *some understanding* as to the principle upon which the Government was to be conducted, as far as regards appointments to office, his Excellency positively refused to recognize it as a constitutional principle that he should consult them at all upon this important department of the administration of public affairs; evidently claiming its patronage *ad libitum* without the advice, counsel, or concurrence of his responsible advisers."—[March 13]. With the latter part of this statement I have at present nothing to do. I have heretofore shewn its falsity, and proved that it was impossible for the Governor-General to make any appointment, without the concurrence of at least one "responsible adviser," and that His Excellency has denied that the right of the Council to advise him was a subject of dispute between him and his late Councilors. But their demanding a declaration of His Excellency's views even on that subject, was as unconstitutional (according to Mr. Boulton's resolution,) as their demanding "*some understanding*" with His Excellency, as to the future policy of appointments, or on any other subject. They were to remain, or to retire from his councils according to his acts, as they were responsible to the Legislature not for his views, but for his acts; and they had no more business with his views, as to what might be or should be, than they had to do with his purse. To seek "some understanding" with him, as to what his views were or might be, was, according to Mr. Boulton's own resolution, unconstitutional; to represent these views to parliament—especially in the teeth of his Excellency's protest—was not only unconstitutional, but unjust and dangerous as I have shown in the second number of this argument.

Then, as to the *fact*—a fact trumpet-tongued in its import and bearing on the character of the present crusade against Sir Charles Metcalfe,—the fact is this:—The late Councilors admit they would have remained in office had the Governor-General's views (which they went to ascertain) as to his future policy accorded with their demands or wishes. This is, they would have assumed the responsibility of his past acts, had he given them assurance or pledge, or "stipulation," as to the character of his future acts!! Can such a proceeding be paralleled in the entire history of England, since 1688? Had the Governor-General's views of future policy proved orthodox, according to the "terms" of the late-born expediency creed of the ex-Councilors, then—can it be believed?—all his past acts would have been defended by them—the very acts they now pronounce unconstitutional—acts which extended over a period of