

## NORAD—Canada-U.S. Agreement

for instantaneous retaliation. General Partridge, the United States commander in chief of NORAD, has stated in more than one published interview that if the NORAD facilities detected an air attack, they would immediately alert the strategic air command so that instant retaliation could be made against the whole country of the attacking planes. It is no secret that there are close working relations between the detection and defensive facilities of NORAD and SAC which provides the United States with its massive retaliatory power.

Nor, is it any secret that the United States strategic air command has always operated entirely independently of the NATO command. As a matter of fact it is under the direct control of the President of the United States. It is capable of carrying both nuclear and thermonuclear explosives. It has been built up for the sole purpose of providing the United States with a means of massive retaliation in the event of war. It is a well known fact that it is SAC, equipped with the heavy B-52 jet bomber and the medium B-47 jet bomber, and not NATO, which supplies the west with its most potent and effective means of deterrence against attack. Only recently, in an interview with the United States Secretary of Defence Neil H. McElroy, *U.S. News and World Report* of April 25, 1958 quotes the secretary as follows:

Certainly, our NATO allies know that, without the protection of the very major-sized deterrent force of this country, the NATO countries would be in a bad way to defend themselves against a power of anything like the capability of Russia, especially if we were knocked out.

I think that they would be the first to say that the keystone of the force that deters Russia is right here—sits right here on this continent. It's our heavy-bomb wings, it's the 1,500 B-47 bombers and the refueling that we have that can take many of them to their targets and get them back.

Some of the most able and well informed military minds of the west have been deeply concerned with the procedures followed by the strategic air command—reference to them has been made in a good many publications over recent months—in implementing the distant early warning system. They have expressed fears that these procedures are inherently dangerous and might set off a world catastrophe by sheer accident. Indeed, these fears have been expressed in forthright terms by Britain's eminent military critic and historian, Captain B. H. Liddel Hart, in an article entitled "The Perils of Alertness" published last January in the *New York Herald-Tribune*.

Captain Hart was commenting on the facts disclosed last fall by General Power, the commander of the strategic air command, that his force of over 2,000 jet bombers

equipped with nuclear bombs was in a state of constant readiness. Captain Hart pointed out the grave possibility of human error, of misreading the radar screen, of becoming trigger-happy under the intense strain of misgauging imminent peril, and of misinterpreting a code. In addition, the syndicated columnist, Dorothy Thompson, commenting on these observations of one of the most acute military minds in the west, says this:

Certainly those who designed it (the alert system) and the governments that have accepted it will deny danger.

But Captain Liddel Hart, with long knowledge of men and war, who is no hysteric, sees grave dangers in a system under which a decision of life or death might be made by one man, or a few whom he informs, in minutes.

That is from the *Globe and Mail* of April 25, 1958. Therefore, in the opinion of this group it would be the epitome of folly to ignore the sober observations of a man of the background and calibre of Captain Hart. It is therefore of the utmost importance that Canada, as a member of NORAD, which will work hand in hand with General Power's strategic air command, examine with complete thoroughness the ominous implications of the alert system cited by Captain Hart. No government is justified in asking parliament to ratify an undertaking of such sweeping implications without first giving the members the opportunity to make a careful study of what is involved.

In that respect I should like to quote from a portion of an editorial that appeared in the June 7, 1958 issue of *Saturday Night*, and which deals with some of the dangers we face. This is part of the extract:

A while ago, for instance, Walter S. Robertson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, was testifying before a congressional committee. He was asked: "Did I correctly understand you to say that the heart of the present policy towards China and Formosa is that there is to be kept alive a constant threat of military action vis-à-vis Red China, in the hope that at some point there will be an internal breakdown?"

His reply: "Yes, sir. That is my conception."

That was the conception of the assistant secretary of state of the United States. We can well understand the tension that is the result of military alertness of the dangers inherent therein. But in addition to that we have the tension and the dangers of tension that are constant and developing as a result of the foreign policy of another power. That gives us some cause for concern in this group. I just want to mention this matter and to bring it to the attention of this house.

We in this group believe in collective security. NATO is a form of collective security, a regional pact within the terms of the United Nations charter. This will be a