

without ensuring that the necessary mechanisms for its enforcement were in place? We believe it would. Would such a development be in the interests of all parties to any such agreement? We strongly believe it would not. Also troubling is the reference to peaceful nuclear explosions. From a scientific and technical point of view it is undeniable that there is no distinction between peaceful and weapons related nuclear explosions. Thus, we will have to look very closely at any wording that suggests otherwise.

Seismic verification: Canada will continue to play an active role in resolving questions related to seismic verification of a test ban agreement. The discussions in Geneva on an international seismic data exchange, we believe, have shown the potential of enabling participating states to ascertain satisfactorily compliance with a test ban treaty on the part of other states. Indeed, we believe that the exchange could – and should – be fully operational at an early date and in advance of the treaty itself.

Approaches to nuclear issues: At the second Special Session, Prime Minister Trudeau proposed a policy of stabilization which, he said, had two complementary components – the suffocation strategy which seeks to inhibit the development of new weapons systems, and our negotiating approach aimed at qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels.

This is what we mean by “freeze”: the halt of the technological momentum of the arms race should be accomplished by freezing at the initial or testing stage of the development of new weapons systems and the number of nuclear arms should be frozen at lower levels. Here it is necessary to make two points. This approach cannot be applied unilaterally: it envisages concrete negotiations between nuclear powers. Second, we note that a number of other kinds of proposal for freeze have already been put forward. Many suffer from the same fundamental flaw: not being verifiable, they do not contribute to creating the conditions of stability we all seek.

**Chemical
weapons**

Chemical weapons convention: For the third year, the Chemical Weapons Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament has registered encouraging progress. Several working papers were tabled. While this difficult subject requires further work, we consider that conditions are right to move forward on the negotiation of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. While we do not underestimate the technical difficulties still before us, we are encouraged by the contributions made by all in the committee and, indeed, by a number outside of it.

Use of chemical weapons: The past year has seen the continuation of the investigation of the reports of the use of chemical weapons which this committee launched two years ago. Canada has sought to contribute to the work of the Experts Group by submitting three reports, including an independent study on mycotoxins in certain
