

headquarters and providing adequate logistics, particularly in the early days of an operation.

Somalia has not been a good test case for this first UN attempt at peace enforcement, but this is certainly not all due to institutional problems. Given the political will and the resources, it is possible to see the UN developing a modest but effective capacity for peace enforcement, including the ability to disarm, demobilize and verify, without necessarily having the consent of all parties. Inherent in this is risk and the willingness to take casualties as a result.

When referring to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it must be recalled that it is not only the "use of force" chapter. It also covers coercive measures not involving the use of armed force, such as complete or partial interruption of economic relations and all means of communications, as well as the breaking of diplomatic relations, but these are outside the scope of this study.

Creation of a new category of UN peace operation does not rule out future coalition actions such as that authorized by the Security Council for the Persian Gulf War and the Unified Task Force operation, Restore Hope, in Somalia. The UN, in Korea, in the Gulf and, for a time, in Somalia, has been content, for varying reasons, to stand back and let coalitions lead. That leadership has been provided with varying amounts of "political cover" provided by the Security Council or the General Assembly. This will probably continue to be the situation for the foreseeable future.

Post-Conflict Peace-Building

Post-conflict peace-building, as defined by the United Nations, is action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. "It must be linked to the comprehensive development efforts of the UN, political, economic, social and cultural . . . reinforcing the

confidence necessary for the creation of lasting peace."⁹ In that light the Secretary-General of the UN has taken steps toward a more integrated policy between the Security Council and a rejuvenated Economic and Social Council. The UN has also recognized that many of the techniques used in preventive diplomacy are applicable in post-conflict peace-building. Central to the process will be the strengthening of democratic institutions. Although this is a fairly new concept for the United Nations, the organization has embraced it in full measure in recent operations, most significantly in Cambodia, but also in Central America, Angola and Mozambique.

In Cambodia the aim was to establish conditions for the holding of "free and fair" elections. In order to do that, the UN had to go well beyond any mandate executed up to that time. In the most extreme case, the UN accepted temporary governmental powers and hence responsibility for the running of key ministries during the transition phase between the political settlement and the elections. In addition to actually organizing and conducting the elections, it had responsibility for monitoring human rights, ensuring the return of refugees, rehabilitating the infrastructure, assisting economic development and supervising the police force. All of those actions were vital to the election process but, more important, were essential to the long-term survival of the country. It is in the post-transitional phase that these efforts toward post-conflict peace-building will really bear fruit or not.

Cambodia will be a major test for the organization. It is here that the most elaborate planning and preparation have gone on in order to give the new government a chance to survive, and to allow the development of democratic institutions in concert with economic and social development.

In all the operations cited above, the tasks, in addition to post-conflict peace-building per se, also involved the repatriation of refugees and

⁹ Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, document no. A/48/1, September 10, 1993.

