

short of what Western governments are willing to accept, thus "flattering" liberals and reformists, and promoting a rearrangement of influence patterns within Western societies to favour increased collaboration with the USSR.

Moscow presumably recognizes that the CSCE would not be an appropriate forum for the negotiation of multilateral trade and monetary agreements. It would therefore seek general statements of principle on East-West trade and financial relations, leaving a detailed discussion of most-favoured-nation treatment, quantitative restrictions, and related matters to bilateral negotiations or to institutions such as the Economic Commission for Europe. The main practical tasks at Helsinki would be to negotiate political, industrial, technological, scientific, cultural, and environmental arrangements that would lend new stability to East-West relations and also create favourable conditions for trade and financial measures that would be pressed forward elsewhere. In the political sphere, Moscow would seek Western recognition of the principle of peaceful coexistence, an affirmation of existing European frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, renunciation of the use of and threat to use force, and preservation of the sovereign independence and equality of the participating states. Certain confidence-building measures might also be pursued, including exchanges of military personnel and the positioning of military observers