

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

only through joint efforts. Specifically, there is another State possessing a chemical weapons stockpile which is as considerable as ours, and we cannot expect a successful outcome without its positive contribution to the negotiations. We have, of course, duly noted the statements in favour of a chemical weapons ban made during the election campaign by the newly elected President of the United States, G. Bush. We hope that it will not be too long before we see these statements materialize into specific positions on the part of the United States delegation at the negotiations. We also welcome the positive changes in the French position which were announced by President Mitterrand at the United Nations and which were referred to here in Geneva by Minister Dumas.

Now a few words about our approach to the main tasks facing the negotiations. They include in the first place the issue of undiminished security of participants in the convention during the first 10-year period after entry into force. The solution to this issue should be based on a complete cessation of development and production of chemical weapons, strict verification of stockpiles of these weapons and facilities for their production, assymetric reductions leading to a levelling out at a certain point after the entry of the convention into force, and the creation of machinery for co-operation in the field of protection from chemical weapons. Another important factor that should not be ignored, in our view, is confidence-building not only during the initial period after the convention enters into force but also prior to its entry into force, as well as the need to ensure universal accession to the future convention as soon as possible. The Paris Conference provides an impetus to solving this problem as well, by calling upon all States to become parties to the convention as soon as it is concluded. In fact the preparations for the convention's entry into force have already begun. This is being facilitated in particular by the national verification experiments being conducted in a number of States. Judging from our experience, they may prove useful not only from the standpoint of elaborating inspection procedures, but also in enabling States to gain initial experience in their practical application.

Soviet specialists are getting ready for the entry into operation of the chemical weapons destruction facility in Chapaevsk, so as to proceed immediately to the destruction of the chemical weapon stockpile as soon as the facility is ready, even before the convention enters into force. In this connection, special attention is being paid to security and ecological aspects of the problem of destruction.

It is important to finalize agreement on the issue of verification. First and foremost, I am thinking of challenge inspections. Work carried out during the past two years provides a sound basis for that. Agreement also has yet to be reached on verification under article VI of the draft convention, including verification in respect of laboratory synthesis of schedule [1] chemicals and the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals which are not chemical warfare agents. We believe that in order to finalize the verification system we can use the existing potential in the form of ideas which have been advanced. What I mean is the possibility for the international inspectorate to conduct on-site inspections on its own