

the recognition and inviolability of borders be another. And direct security issues, even confidence and security building measures, were late in the game. So it is not only when things are better that you can do it.

Franck: I was going to say in response to Brian, that a state of mind is the only state worth a damn... You can't talk about regional organizations, a lot of these are regional organizations only by the wildest stretch of the imagination. Any regional organization that includes Turkey and British Columbia obviously is a funny kind of regional organization, and any regional organization that includes Turkey and Ireland, or Malaysia and Egypt is a funny kind of regional organization. The notion has gotten rather diffuse and it is much more important to talk in terms of interest groupings.

Moreover, the OAU has not been useless. The Chad-Libya dispute, which I am currently involved in, was brought to the International Court by pressure by the OAU. Neither the Libyans nor the Chadians thought that this was their preferred way of achieving a satisfactory outcome, and it was eventually the OAU that prevailed – an agreement to go through a year of negotiation and if that failed there was to be result certain in the International Court. So there is a kind of ethos in the OAU which is not nothing.

Ward: I would like to put a question to Ambassador Moussa because I think the answer might not be too optimistic. There is much talk that at the end of the Gulf conflict there must be some kind of regional, not only peacekeeping, but perhaps arms control planning. What would you think the prospects are for an effective arms control plan?

Moussa: Well, thank you for this very complicated question. Any weapons control, disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, has to include all countries, particularly Israel. We cannot, even now, agree with the opinion that Iraq, within the framework of its conflict with Kuwait, be subjected to certain arrangements for the limitation of or elimination of or supervision of its arms, chemical or biological or whatever – while leaving Israel outside of any control system. The region should be declared free from weapons of mass destruction. So any system there has to include nuclear weapons, which means Israel has to adhere to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Ward: Israel is nowhere close to accepting such a thing, but what do you think the climate of opinion is within the Arab states?

Moussa: Perhaps you are reading between the lines; that there are certain Arab countries, small countries, that do not really care about what Israel has now, they have Iraq in mind. But if you go deeper, a security system there cannot be established without the participation of Israel, without control over Israeli arms. If you want a viable system you cannot exclude anyone of the major powers in the area – Arab, Persian, Turkish or Jewish.

Ward: So really you are saying that after the Gulf conflict is settled there can be no arms control arrangement in that area unless there is an International Conference to settle these other issues.

Moussa: Yes, because Israel will not, and other Arabs might not, be able to sit around the same table to discuss weapons control without solving the Palestinian problem. But I would add a note here that it is not without “solving” the

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Palestinian problem, but without starting the process. Once you start a viable peace process, this would allow the discussion of weapons systems and other things.

Wood: Is there a special responsibility for what one can loosely call middle powers? There was a lot of discussion, at the time of the writing of the Charter, about Security Council non-permanent membership? The concept of some special responsibilities of a group of states, apart from the permanent members, runs into some philosophical difficulty with the assumption of sovereign equality of all other members.

Urquhart: This was an extremely important, though not formalized view, in the previous period of considerable success of the UN which was the Hammarskjöld period. Hammarskjöld operated throughout the world through a very close, almost personal, relationship with what I think you call middle powers. He had an ex-

tremely important relationship with Mahmoud Fawzi, [Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister from 1953 to 1962] in Egypt. He had a very important relationship with Mike Pearson and with Nehru, and he operated on the basis of a very constant and detailed personal correspondence with a number of leaders in what you are calling middle powers. It certainly was one of the most important supports he had. I think it is a concept you can use, provided you don't formalize it.

Moussa: I believe this idea should be reactivated and very soon, at the moment when this “new world order” is very much talked about and when it's no longer a bi-polar system. It is one superpower with other big powers behind it, and then the Third World. What is the North anyway? It is the five biggest or seven richest or twelve European states, and the South is totally devoid of superpowers or centres of power. So some of us came up with the idea of middle powers – that between North and South has to be India and Egypt and Brazil and Argentina and Indonesia, as responsible countries, to bridge the two worlds. Just imagine the Council in 1990, when this Gulf problem erupted, if the middle powers had been even more fully represented. It might have been a different and very responsible discussion.

Urquhart: The real trouble in the UN is to get a serious discussion going on basic subjects, which will actually have some effect. Let us suppose for a moment that this is a historical turning point – everybody keeps telling us it is – then I think it is terribly important to have that serious discussion, and I don't think you will get it started with the remaining superpower or any of the other permanent members of the Security Council. They all have a rather important vested interest in not rocking the boat and maintaining the status quo – not least the British and the French, who if they rock the boat are likely to fall out. On the other hand, there are the middle powers, which I call the sensible countries. They were once mobilized by one very remarkable person with extraordinary success. This was the basis of everything that Hammarskjöld did. And it actually had some quite abiding institutional consequences.

There is now quite a considerable group of sensible countries which is extremely interested in really reforming the organization and its leadership. It has grown up in the last year, and they are a group of very intelligent, active, permanent representatives, of whom we have two here today.