

corrupt bargain, calculated to impede the course of justice."

What is here quoted is, undoubtedly, pregnant with truth; yet one cannot forget the fact that the public has every right to expect a bank, or any institution, to exercise the utmost diligence in the performance of its duty; and only in exceptional cases is it under obligation to apologize for allowing the "twilight of dubiety" to fall upon it.

Past experience teaches that a bank's ability to recognize its duty is very fickle and very weak. In the present case the bank seems to have done its duty—has, it is believed, offered no impediment to justice.

The points of view of both bank and people are diametrically opposed to each other.

A bank believes in acting, first for itself, and then for the public. The people, on the other hand, consider that public policy supersedes, on all occasions, matters of private concern.

It would be well for the banks to remember that the view of society is accepted as the right one, and that until they themselves accept, and act upon it, distrust and suspicion must, in large part, be their portion.

It is a pity that the bank did not discover the frauds whilst they were still in their infancy.

For frauds, such as these, discovered only when they have become enormous, seriously disturb the commercial world, shake the faith of shareholders, and greatly injure the good business morals and integrity of the people at large.

Of course, the bank considers that it can furnish a very good excuse to its shareholders and others who rely upon its solvency and its management; for, as stated in the evidence, it "did not look to Chisholm for the security of the bill. It looked primarily to the