

From the outset there was full agreement that there should be no re-creation of a German General Staff or of a German national army, and no revival of heavy war industry in Germany. The original plan proposed by the United States in September was that German units on a divisional scale should be incorporated in a Western European integrated force. This plan was unacceptable to the French, and although they were prepared to recognize, in principle, the importance of incorporation of Germans in Western defence, deadlock developed over the form, timing, and scale. The French proposed instead that Germans should be organized in units no larger than battalions, and that no Germans should be re-armed ahead of the European members of NATO; and as an additional safeguard, that they should be included only in a European army which would form part of the integrated force. The European army would be under European political control. Further, no steps should be taken to re-arm Germans until further progress had been made towards the integration of German coal and steel industries with those of Western Europe, and hence towards European rather than German control of these industries, as proposed in the Schuman Plan.

Agreement Reached

Under the stress of events unanimous agreement was reached at the Brussels meeting to a compromise plan by which Germans would be incorporated into the integrated European force in units smaller than divisional strength. The French in turn were to be free to call a meeting early in the year of the governments concerned with the establishment of a European army.

In the meantime, the Occupying Powers are authorized to begin negotiations with the West German Government. Effective co-operation by Western Germany in the common defence will require the willing support of the West German people. To date there has been little indication that this will be forthcoming. Indeed, the evidence is that rearmament has little appeal for most West Germans, except possibly on terms of full equality. The Germans are likely to seek the best bargain possible; and German units, even for training purposes, cannot be expected for several months.

It generally takes much less time to turn raw recruits into soldiers than to produce modern military equipment from scratch. There is urgent need for production to keep pace with expanding forces. Under the best of circumstances we could scarcely have expected much more equipment to be available by the end of 1950 than is actually the case. In addition to the inevitable delay normally involved in producing new equipment, or in converting peacetime industries to wartime production, certain problems arose out of the nature of the collective enterprise on which North Atlantic Treaty countries are engaged. Some of these questions could only be answered after preliminary planning for the defence of the whole area. For example: What items of equipment were most urgently needed and in what quantities? What types of equipment were militarily most suitable for national forces who would have to operate together? Among other questions involving economic and financial considerations are: Where could the items required be most economically produced? How could equipment, or raw materials for production, from dollar areas, be paid for by European members short of dollar exchange?

In December 1949, a Military Production and Supply Board, on which all NATO Countries were represented by senior officials, was established. This Board, with its Permanent Working Staff, did useful service in estimating needs, in deciding what items should have high priority and in surveying possible sources of production. To co-ordinate production more effectively, the meeting in Brussels decided to replace the Military Production and Supply Board by a new organization with wider powers: the Defence Production Board. Its functions will be to expand and accelerate production and to further the mutual use of the industrial capacities of all member