

mind the assertions of Soviet spokesmen that proposals such as those for a Multilateral Nuclear Force, an Atlantic Nuclear Force or similar arrangements for sharing nuclear arms would contribute to their dissemination. Under Article I of the U.S. draft, the nuclear powers would undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons into the control of other states, either directly or indirectly through a multilateral alliance. They would also undertake to do nothing to cause an increase in the total number of states or other organizations with the independent power to use nuclear weapons. In addition, they would commit themselves not to assist any other state in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Reciprocal obligations in respect of the non-nuclear powers are contained in Article II.

Clearly, these articles would prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear country and would also prevent any non-nuclear country from acquiring such weapons through manufacture. Moreover, the language of Articles I and II would prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons indirectly, through a military alliance such as NATO, into the national control of any country not possessing them. These articles would also prohibit any other action that would cause an increase in the total number of states and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons. Since there are at present five nuclear powers, any action that would increase the number of international entities with the power to use nuclear weapons beyond the present five would also be prohibited. The only foreseeable way, therefore, in which a new association having independent power to use nuclear weapons could come into existence would be through the voluntary transfer by one of the present nuclear powers to the new international entity of its stockpiles of nuclear weapons, together with its authority to control the use of such weapons.

In arriving at this formulation, Western representatives had in mind the importance at the present stage in world history of not embodying in a treaty on non-proliferation a provision that might erect a barrier to the free evolution of political, economic and social institutions as desired by peoples and governments throughout the world. In the period since the end of the Second World War, the countries of Europe especially but those in other regions as well — for example, in Africa — have from time to time created new international machinery for closer cooperation in dealing with specific problems and have also discussed proposals for new institutions to regulate their affairs on a regional basis. In general, Canadian governments have welcomed moves in this direction as contributing to the strengthening of regional social and economic development, and thus to world stability and the maintenance of international peace and security. To incorporate in a general international treaty of indefinite duration language that might impede the creation of new institutions, including collective defence arrangements, provided always that such arrangements would not constitute nuclear proliferation, seemed to Western representatives a step incompatible with the fundamental interests not only of members of the Alliance but also of other nations.

During discussions in the ENDC, the United States representative stated