

Militia and Defence.

(1.) *Position of the General Officer Commanding the Militia.*

The responsibilities of the General Officer in command of the Militia are laid down in the Militia Act of 1836, as those of "Military Command." Military Command is defined by the Queen's Regulations and Orders which are equally binding in Canada as elsewhere in the absence of other local legislation, (Militia Act, sec. 82). It is essential that these responsibilities, which are clearly indicated in Section 2 and Appendix I, Queen's Regulations, 1895, should be made clear and definite. The necessity for this step has been frequently urged, and the absence of a clear definition of these duties has been a fruitful cause of difficulty and friction between the Military and Civil Branches of the Militia Department. The Civil Branch has usurped many of the functions of the Military Command, thus reducing the powers of the General in Command, while leaving him his responsibilities as the military head under, and as the military adviser to the Minister of Defence.

If any system of sound military administration is to replace that which exists it can only be by placing in the hands of the General Officer Commanding his legitimate military functions.

In Appendix "G" will be found the responsibilities which, in accordance with Queen's Regulations, are recommended as consistent with the position of the General Officer Commanding and the Deputy Minister, in their relation to the Minister of Militia and Defence.

(2.) *Creation of a Militia Army for Canada.*

Under the existing circumstances any considerable increase to the present strength of the Militia Force is inadvisable, but I wish most strongly to urge that a complete though gradual change should be effected in the organization and administration of the whole Force, so as to conform to the requirements of the principles which I have ventured to submit. This change can be effected with comparatively small increase to the yearly Budget. It will be time enough to consider whether an increase of the troops is necessary, when the present military situation in Canada has been made to approximate to modern military requirements.

The difficulties incidental to the transformation of the existing Militia Force into a Militia Army need not be great.

The creation of the necessary administrative departments indicated in Sec. (36) does not present any serious difficulty. The system existing in Switzerland for the organization of these departments might be adopted with advantage. I would instance, as an illustration, the Army Service Corps. This all important department consists of two separate branches, viz. :—Supply and Transport. The Officers and personnel required for the Supply Branch might, with the greatest advantage, be recruited from those citizens whose civil occupations associate them with similar vocations in ordinary life. Similarly, the personnel of the Transport Service would be recruited from those whose civil occupation is concerned with transport by rail, land or water. The personnel required for each branch is not large, as the detail work of supply of food and forage, and the work of transport would be largely, if not entirely, performed by contract, and the military staff would be only concerned in the direction and military supervision of the contract system. This is the method adopted in most of the colonies of the Empire, and has been usual in many of our recent campaigns. It will be observed that the difficulties of organizing this department are more those of organization, administration and of military training than of a large expenditure of public money.

As with this department, so with the Ordnance Store Corps, and Pay Department. The Army Medical Corps and the Corps of Engineers would alone necessitate the organisation of a considerable personnel and the purchase of a suitable equipment. It may well be arranged for the conversion of some of the existing units into the personnel required for these two indispensable departments, and thus save the additional expense which an increase in the existing militia establishments would otherwise entail.

It is impracticable to attempt any form of administration which can be applicable on mobilization for war unless the existing small units of varying size are increased