

defence of the central part of the country, and in this respect it has advantages that are not possessed by any other place on the Lake that could be selected as a Naval Station. Vessels of war issuing from the harbour would command the Upper St. Lawrence, whilst troops acting from Kingston as a support, would be available for the defence of a certain portion of the left bank of that river.

Next to Montreal and Quebec, Kingston is therefore the place of which the enemy would most desire to obtain possession.

Enemy might make a diversion on Niagara or Detroit frontiers.

11. At the same time that the enemy made an attack upon Lower Canada and upon Kingston, he might make a diversion upon the Niagara frontier (to which there is a communication both by railway and canal from Albany), or upon the Detroit frontier, with a view of drawing off a portion of the Canadian forces from the main scene of operations. It is more probable that he would make such diversion upon the former than the latter, as the Niagara frontier is so much nearer his base at Albany.

Or land troops on shores of Lakes.

12. In connexion with either of these attacks upon the Western Peninsula, the enemy, as before observed, might land troops from steam vessels upon the shores of the Lakes, and take in reverse the forces defending the land frontiers.

## II.—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS RESPECTING THE DEFENCE OF CANADA.

Attacks could not be resisted in open field.

13. In considering what forces would be necessary for the defence of the country to meet any of these attacks, it is obvious that it would be out of the question to resist with a hope of success in the open field the armies that might be employed by a State, whose population is about five times as great as that of the territory to be defended, and which, acting from the centre at Albany against a long straight line of frontier without any natural advantages for defence, might concentrate a large proportion of his forces upon any vital point.

Fortifications therefore necessary.

14. It is only by availing ourselves of the advantages of works of fortification that we can provide against the Canadian forces being overpowered.

Fortifications enable an inferior force to resist a greatly superior one, and, by their means, troops whose services would be of comparatively little value in the field, would be turned to good account. Once constructed, it costs little (not  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.) to maintain them, and under the circumstances now under consideration they would afford a basis for the most economical and the only efficient system of defence.

Fortifications especially applicable in Canada.

15. Irrespective of other considerations, there is a special reason why fortifications in this country would fulfil the required object, and that is, that it would be impossible for an enemy to besiege them or to remain before them during the winter season.

When it is considered that he would have to go through many preliminary operations before he could commence a siege, and that if he had not been successful in such siege, he must retire before the winter set in, it will be seen that the period during which he could remain before a place would be comparatively short.

It should be borne in mind that a large force can only move and keep the field for about five months in the year, viz., from about the middle of May to the middle of October; during the latter part of October to the middle of December, the communications would be more or less difficult, according to the amount of rain or snow which falls; between the middle of December and the end of March, the intense cold forbids an army encamping, and the deep snows prevent the movement of troops except on beaten tracks, on which they could show no front, and numbers would consequently be of no use; from the beginning of April to about the middle of May the state of the roads owing to the thaw of the winter snows, is such that many are impassable for an army.

16. It is only then, for about half the year, that military operations on a large scale could be carried on, and it is submitted that by the aid of fortifications it is perfectly practicable to provide for the defence of the country during this period.

Vital points to be defended by fortifications.

17. It is proposed that the vital points of the country should be protected by works of fortification, chiefly earthworks, constructed in the form of extensive entrenched camps, each of which would form a focus of refuge and action for the troops employed in the defence of that section of the country in which it is situated.

Upon which forces would retire.

18. Upon these points respectively, our forces, if overpowered, would retire, after they had opposed the enemy as much as possible in the most favourable positions, which should be previously determined upon and strengthened with field works. The force for the defence of Quebec might oppose the enemy at Sherbrooke, near the Railway junction at Richmond, and at any other points that might be selected. A portion of that for the defence of Montreal, fit to take the field, might, in the first instance, take up a position at St. John's. The position between the junction of the Ottawa and Kingston, would be protected by troops acting respectively from Montreal and Kingston, and by a force near Prescott which could fall back upon Ottawa.

Toronto and Hamilton.

19. Assuming that the Canadian shores of Lake Ontario were protected by a naval force, troops acting in the Western Districts, if overpowered, should fall back upon some point on the Lake, where there is a harbour, which would enable them to act in conjunction with that force. There are two points which present themselves for selection, at both of which there are harbours and considerable towns, viz: Toronto and Hamilton. Both of them are capable of being formed into extensive fortified entrenched camps, and each has its advantages. The balance, however, appears decidedly in favour of Toronto. Hamilton occupies a good position, within which troops might fall back, either from the Detroit or Niagara frontiers; but its close proximity to the Niagara frontier, would afford comparative facility to the enemy for its attack. Toronto, on the other hand, being nearer Kingston, and further from the enemy, whilst it is also opposite Lake Simcoe, between it and which there is a narrow belt of country only about 30 miles in extent, being moreover the capital of Upper Canada, would appear without doubt to be the best place for selection as the centre to which troops should converge. It has further the advantage in that the ground in its vicinity is more favourable for the construction of earthworks than on a portion of the defensive line around Hamilton, where the site for a distance of four miles is of rock.