

The original offer of Great Britain was to carry the boundary along the 49th parallel of latitude, which separates the territories of the two nations from the Lakes to the Rocky Mountains, until it should strike the waters of MacGillivray's river, and then follow the course of that river and the Columbia to the sea, retaining the freedom of navigating the Columbia; and as by this arrangement it was considered that the United States would have no harbour on the coast—that at the mouth of the Columbia being, as has been shewn, of very little value—a detached territory, from Bullfinches' Harbour to Hood's Canal, of course including Ports Discovery and Hudson, was subsequently added.

On the part of the United States it was proposed that parallel forty-nine should be the boundary across Vancouver's Island to the Pacific, and that the navigation of the Columbia should be common to both nations; but, in order to give Great Britain a harbour in the Strait of Fuca, the south part of Vancouver's Island, which that line would have cut off, was offered to her in addition; but, subsequently, the navigation of the Columbia was reserved to the United States.

These offers respectively Great Britain could not, and the United States would not, accept. The reasons will be apparent, on a geographical consideration of their several tendencies.

It will be seen, by reference to the map, that by her own offer Great Britain would deprive her subjects of the posts and farms occupied by them south of MacGillivray's and the Columbia rivers, viz. Forts George, Umqua, Hall, Boisee, Nezperces, Colville, Kootonais, Spokane, and Flathead, all of which are of considerable relative importance.

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