

and other international agencies, said Adelman. The policies of these organisations have uneven impact on different segments of post-conflict societies, making the concept irrelevant, at best. Another example challenging neutrality in Bosnia, for instance, was the success of stopping people from killing each other and then failing to assist them in returning to their occupied homes.

The difference between Peacekeeping and peace enforcement was noted. Haines pointed out that while peacekeeping provides conditions for other initiatives to move forward, peace enforcement means enforcing an agreement between opposing side. He went on to say that while it may be possible to remain impartial on the strategic level, it is almost impossible to do so at the tactical level. The military remains key during the transition period (which follows peace enforcement, in most cases) even though it is often difficult to square military and political objectives. While the military may not be trained to fulfil civilian functions, such as policing, for instance, many militaries are ready and often competent to play these roles. Much depends on the type of training and culture.

The importance of long term commitment in peace operations and the need for political will and public support was emphasised.

A Structural Model of the Preconditions of Genocide and Politicide

There was some discussion of a model to identify states at high risk of genocide and politicide, devised by Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr in partnership with the U.S. government. The model identifies countries at risk of genocide and politicide in the early 21st century, based on a range of "risk factors" including: the salience of elite ethnicity, exclusionary ideology, autocratic regime, and others. While examples of countries at risk were provided, they were selected randomly rather than in a descending order from those most at risk to those least at risk.

Adelman pointed out that the reluctance of the U.S. officials to share the study's results demonstrates rather well the problems related to "hedging responsibility" within the just war framework. The reluctance to publicise comprehensive data is understandable, since awareness or knowledge of an imminent genocide would surely imply a responsibility to intervene. Similar rationale may be applied to Canada's wavering on an Early Warning system. One of the reasons why Canada did not pursue the issue aggressively, despite former Foreign Minister Axworthy's commitment, was that inaction in the face of forecasted genocide would be embarrassing. The issue of diverse Early Warning mechanisms, depending on a state's capability to intervene was also raised, bringing further questions about the ethics of intervention into focus.

Some participants emphasised the need to make the data available, perhaps through an independent commission. Laurence expressed his disagreement with the criticism of the researchers, insisting that their responsibility does not necessarily go beyond producing the analytical tool. It may be entirely up to the policy makers to decide how it is used.