## Updating Treaties, Agreements, Codes of Conduct Domestic Laws and Export/Import Regulations

With regard to limiting or otherwise constraining the undesirable flow of these weapons, there are at present numerous means in effect by which to achieve those ends. The EU Code of Conduct, various UN Declarations, the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking In Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, the OAS "Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition" and the export/import control system of many states all provide the necessary tools to restrain or prevent the diffusion of these weapons into areas where their use may be suspect or where adequate controls are not in effect. However, political will is often the primary ingredient lacking in efforts to ensure that these mechanisms actually work. In some cases, there may be a requirement to update legislation, and create the declaratory and treaty language capable of taking into consideration such items as caseless ammunition, non-lethal chemicals and directed energy systems. Bringing various agreements, conventions, declarations and particularly import/export controls up to date with reference to non-lethal weapons and DEW will be a critical step in the control of SALW proliferation, particularly as legislative changes sometimes tends to be slow.

## **Transparency**

There are numerous references in the academic literature to the need for increased transparency together with other related policy initiatives. This study adds little to these discussions. However, given the difficulties inherent in finding an agreement on registering or otherwise accounting for current SALW inventories on a broad basis (both by state and type/numbers), it might be more fruitful to begin by accounting only for new unique types of SALW as they enter inventories. Examples might be SALW using new types of ammunition, such as the H&K G 11, or unique weapons, such as the US OICW and the French PAPOP. These measures would clearly be more in line with the reasons for transparency in the first place, as they would warn states of new acquisitions which might have an impact on stability and/or could serve to flag potential sources of used SALW which might subsequently be sold or transferred to areas of instability.

## The Rules of War and Arms Control Agreements

It seems apparent that some of the issues concerning SALW might also be addressed within the context of the rules of war. This approach could be particularly useful with regard to SALW ammunition (including non-lethal ammunition) and DEW. Present technological developments would appear to mitigate for such a review. One might note that at present it is

For a background and ideas on transparency see: Canada, DFAIT, An International Register of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Issues and Model (Ottawa, October 1998).