

II Key Findings

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The context of a changing world in the period 1992-2002 will affect future arms control agreements and their verification regimes.

- Arms control, in a variety of forms — multi-lateral, bilateral, unilateral, global, regional — will remain a fundamental approach to international security. However, the context in which future multilateral arms control will have to operate will be a disorderly, unstable world with little wars and emerging proliferators.
- The War in the Persian Gulf was reflective of the regional instabilities associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their advanced delivery systems and conventional weapons over and above the needs of legitimate defense.
- UNSCOM inspections in Iraq have served to underline that in the future, some countries will be prepared to cheat on their obligations associated with non-proliferation.
- The list of countries developing or acquiring chemical and/or biological weapons for future use will increase despite the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The countries developing nuclear weapons for the first time will be a small number of pariah states. Ballistic missiles will proliferate, as will advanced conventional weapons, for reasons of regional instabilities in the Third World as well as economic motives on the part of the suppliers.

Concerns over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their advanced delivery systems and sophisticated conventional weapons will change both conceptual and programmatic aspects of verification.

- While verification regimes among developed, democratic nations will continue to be based on the assumption of an increasing degree of cooperation, verification regimes involving emerging weapons states may require adversarial or coercive verification.

- A verification regime dependent upon a high degree of cooperation could be dangerously vulnerable if international relations deteriorate.
- Monitoring arms control agreements will continue to be primarily a function of intelligence collection and analysis, utilizing national technical means, international technical means, multilateral technical means (NTM/ITM/MTM) and/or national intelligence means (NIM). NIM is defined as the sum of a country's intelligence collection and analysis capabilities.
- NIM, which includes HUMINT, collection by human sources and the analysis of open-source information such as media or commercial satellite photography, will be of increasing importance in this period of proliferation.
- Monitoring systems will be complemented by more cooperative measures.
- Verification based on OSI of declared facilities may make cheating considerably more difficult, but it does little to deter the use of covert facilities and activities for the development of weapons.
- Ineffectual verification regimes may produce a false sense of confidence which could be worse than no verification regime whatsoever, for example, a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
- Challenge or suspect site inspections may not detect a violation, but their existence can trigger a synergistic effect when combined with other collection methods. Furthermore, refusal of an inspection will reinforce suspicions of illegal activities which can focus other collection resources on that facility.
- In a cooperative environment such as the present relationship between the United States and Russia, elimination of short-range theater nuclear weapons might be accompanied by CBMs such as invitational inspec-

