

an "agent of influence" or "an agent of disinformation," or both. It appears that this charge is even tougher than espionage to test. Confronted with an External Affairs study showing that Norman's reporting from Cairo had been "outstanding," and revealed no trace of Communist bias, Barros accused the authors of naiveté. "No agent of influence," he contended, "would be foolish enough to reveal anything in a telegram or dispatch" (185). He did not explain how Norman might have conveyed his treacherous advice from Cairo and Ottawa.

The researcher's problem is compounded when seeking to uncover an "agent of disinformation." Barros explains that "the information imparted can be false, partly false, or completely true." What does that exclude? Moreover, Barros, with rare generosity, notes that "... even honest civil servants often interpret the same facts in different ways and offer divergent advice..." (144). My primary commitment - to read the External files and pass judgment on Norman's loyalty - did indeed seem daunting! Even facts, it appears, can be evidence of treasonous "misinformation."

Fortunately, in several other situations Barros recommended a simpler approach. One of these arises out of the necessity that he perceives to test Pearson's loyalty during his entire period as a Minister and Prime Minister (201). The Barros approved method is to "juxtapose" a person's advice or actions against "Russian objectives." (186)

Up to a point, this is the approach I adopted as I waded through the "Norman" content of a multitude of External files. I also looked for evidence that Norman, in his reporting and recommendations, might have strayed from the well established consensus within the Canadian policy community about our interests and approach in the Far East, the Middle East and New Zealand. I also checked my memory against those of most of the officers who had worked with Norman in his three posts, or in External's Far Eastern Division. This procedure may not satisfy anyone who thinks that Canadian policy is made by an "Old Boys Club" or dominated by "pinks," as does Dr. Alex Kindy M.P. (Debates, 4.11.86; 19.12.86), or that Lester Pearson might have been "Moscow's ultimate mole" (Barros 201). Nor will it necessarily help if I explain that my knowledge of the broad lines of Canadian foreign policy comes from six years as a neophyte foreign service officer in Bonn and Ottawa (1953-9), and as a teacher and researcher of that policy in the years since. I never met Norman, and saw very little of Pearson until he came to Carleton as a teacher in his last two years. Until I accepted this assignment, I had read none of the books by or about Herbert Norman. My knowledge of espionage came almost exclusively from Le Carré.