c) SDI and NORAD

The White Paper draws our attention to the active research programme underway in the United States concerning the prospects of strategic defence both against the ballistic missile and against aircraft armed with cruise missiles. Canada participates in the latter. Although some degree of SDI research is prudent, the White Paper's implication that we should await the outcome of the research before taking a position on the possible contribution, if any, that Canada might make to SDI appears to overlook the main issue. This is that US/USSR agreement on the nature of this research will be essential if the current negotiations on strategic arms are to succeed.

It is true, as the White Paper asserts, that "Canada will still require a capacity to exercise effective surveillance and control over its air, land and sea space," whatever the outcome of SDI. Perhaps this surveillance will best be carried out by space-based radar systems, but if so the logic of geography will point towards co-operation with the United States, while the logic of politics may point in the opposite direction. It would make little sense to share strategic defence assets with the United States if these in turn were to impel the Soviet Union to increase the offensive threat they are designed to counter. As the Prime Minister put the matter in May 1987: "we cannot allow strategic defences to undermine the arms control process."

d) Cruise Missile Testing

The air defence issue is complicated by the bilateral agreement to test the air-launched cruise missile. In February 1987 the Umbrella Testing Agreement was extended for