

to the desirability of establishing a warning system which it seemed would create greater confidence and would in any case not prejudice future action if a scientific breakthrough could be achieved. The way would then be open for the establishment of a fully comprehensive disarmament programme as had been envisaged originally.

While the meetings were underway Mr. Bulganin, in a letter to President Eisenhower presented in Washington on September 20, indicated his acceptance of certain elements of the Eisenhower proposals but in view of the approaching meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva, the Subcommittee again had to discontinue its work.

As was indicated the other day in the Disarmament Commission, we were disappointed at the lack of progress in Geneva. The failure on the part of the Foreign Ministers to reach agreement on the major political issues was bound to make it more difficult to advance in the field of disarmament and it was soon evident that even on the latter problem no progress would be possible.

It is significant that in the course of the Geneva meeting the other two Western Foreign Ministers, without abandoning their objective of a comprehensive disarmament programme extending to all kinds of weapons, concurred in the suggestion that there might be put into operation a plan to help prevent a surprise attack along the lines envisaged by President Eisenhower. It will be recalled that the Canadian Government expressed early in September its strong approval in principle of the Eisenhower plan, we feel that this was a plan that was bold and imaginative; coming as it did from this particular source, it was capable of giving us and the world the kind of confidence and trust which we need so much at this time.

I have studied carefully Mr. Kuznetsov's last statement. The essential point he makes is one we ourselves have emphasized all along: to achieve progress in the field of disarmament, it is necessary to increase confidence. In order to increase confidence and to reduce international tension, an advance must be made along a broad front, dealing with the related political, economic and military problems which divide the opposing groups.

We agree that confidence is of the essence and that disarmament is linked with the major political issues facing us.

Yet, at Geneva, where the Western Powers made an effort to resolve the main outstanding political problems, we know what was the Soviet reaction and contribution. The record speaks for itself. Both on the question of German re-unification and on that of European security, the Soviet Union took the most intransigent and negative attitude. Such a policy was bound to prejudice any settlement with the consequences which can be foreseen as to the decrease of confidence and the prospects of progress in the field of disarmament.

Concerning disarmament, the Soviet Union contends that it has accepted the three major elements of the programmes recommended by the General Assembly: the elimination of nuclear weapons, reduction of armed forces and armaments, effective inspection and control.