

proportion of the total threat than was expected." But if maximum effectiveness was to be obtained nuclear warheads were necessary.¹⁴ It is of interest that the Conservatives never rejected the nuclear NORAD role during the committee hearings, and that the NDP shifted from their position of demanding complete rejection of NORAD. One of the first shifts in the NDP position was a speech by Mr. Douglas in Vancouver during the early part of 1963 (17-2-63) where he stated that "Canada should continue to supply and maintain warning systems" for NORAD.¹⁵ The NDP shift undoubtedly helped to account for the all-party agreement reached in the first report of the Special Committee on National Defence (20-12-63) where it was recommended that "Canada remain a member of NORAD, since the defence of North America is a joint responsibility," and as long as the bomber threat continued "Canada must share in the defence against that threat." However, the recommendations made no clear distinction between the active and the passive aspects of North American defence which in large part allowed for the all-party agreement.

When the Liberal Government's White Paper on Defence was tabled in 1964 a "downward trend in continental air defence" was predicated, but Canada would always be expected to be involved in "some form of air defence operations." However, as the bomber threat diminished there would be "a gradual phasing-out" of the present arrangement, and subsequently the resources allocated to air defence would "gradually decline." While the question of deploying an ABM system was considered important there were "no major questions of policy" which were "ready for solution" in 1964.¹⁶ During the 1964-66 period the Liberal party publicly maintained this position, and continued to accept both the active and passive roles for Canada.¹⁷ At the National Liberal Party Conference in October of 1966 the plenary resolution simply stated "that Canada continue its participation in NORAD." There is little evidence to indicate that the Conservatives disagreed with the Liberals during this period, and the NORAD question did not assume much significance for any of the major parties.

Even the NDP did not show much concern over continental defence from 1963 to 1966, and at the Third Federal Convention in July, 1965 no mention was made of either NATO or NORAD as China, the UN financial crisis and Vietnam occupied the time of the delegates. Softening of the NDP position, and acceptance of the passive defence role can be seen in Brewin's Stand on Guard (1965) when he stated there was need for "agreement to continue the useful detection aspects of NORAD," but "to discontinue the active defence aspects" which "are now poised against a non-existent threat." Scrapping the active defence elements would not mean "the termination of the joint defence arrangements."¹⁸

By 1966, however, NORAD had again become a party issue. This was partly a result of unification of the Armed Services; but the main factors were obviously the impending U.S. decision on some form of ABM system, and the upcoming Government decision in 1968 on the future of NORAD. The Government maintained that the existing arrangement would continue, while admitting that the major question was the U.S. ABM system.¹⁹ When the ABM issue became more important during 1967 Mr. Hellyer