

we put up barriers against Rome on the one hand and the Polish Brothers on the other hand, or shall we have only one simple Creed, such as the Nicene? The Chevalier Bunsen, unless memory deceives us, proposed that the Church of the future should have a Liturgy but no Articles.

As we have already referred to this subject we need add very little more in this place. Every one, among Protestants, is agreed that the Lay Creed should be as elastic as possible. But we doubt very gravely whether a Creed for the Clergy equally indefinite would not be a cause of division rather than union. There can be no real unity without a principle underneath it, and the principle must be clearly and dogmatically stated.

We do not propose to discuss the conclusions of the Lambeth Conference in regard to the Standards of Doctrine, or we might have something to say about the Athanasian Creed, more particularly as to the excision of the "damnatory clauses." It is generally agreed, even by orthodox Anglicans, that those clauses serve no good purpose in the present day, however it may have been in the past. But this is a matter which concerns the members of the Anglican Communion and not Christians in general, so we need not stop to ask whether the Resolutions of the Committee (the Encyclical Letter does not touch the point), have given the wisest possible decisions on this subject.

To one aspect of the subject, as being of the widest possible interest we will draw attention before concluding. We refer to the popular notion that the Churches might unite on the basis of a non-dogmatic religion, or on that of Holy Scripture without any special definitions of the faith. With regard to the latter suggestion there is a sense in which the Bible is the basis of all Christian Creeds. But this is not the sense of the proposal. The meaning is, that members of the Church should simply declare their adherence to the teaching of Scripture, and form their own conclusions as to its contents. Anything more hopeless we can hardly imagine. We do not possess the first elements of agreement in a common belief of the nature of Scripture authority. And, even among those who are agreed on this fundamental question, there is the widest difference of opinion as to the doctrines which it teaches. All this is so well known that we should hardly care to say it again, only that simple-minded people are constantly propounding this scheme as a remedy for our divisions.

With regard to the other proposal to unite upon the basis of a non-dogmatic religion we imagine that the proposers have scarcely thought out their scheme to the end. They can hardly mean a religion without any doctrines at all; because the very foundation of religion is a doctrine. We mean the existence of God—of a God who can be known, of a God who claims our worship, our obedience, our trust. Here we have already quite a bundle of doctrines. And we can hardly stop here. We must ask again how God makes Himself known, whether in the processes of nature and history alone or in a supernatural manner as well; and we must answer the question, practically at least, one way or the other. And then come all the Christological questions which agitated the Church in the early days of its history; and whether we answer them in the sense of the great Councils or in any other sense, we are practically formulating doctrines. We quite understand the protest against needlessly multiplying the number of doctrines, and we cordially join in it; but this is a very different thing from abolishing doctrine, and it is high time that people should understand this clearly and give up speaking nonsense on the subject.

It will be seen that we have not here, to any great extent, followed the leadings of the Conference for the reasons which we have given. Our own remarks tend more to illustrate the importance of the question to the Christian Church at large; but we do not deny that the utterances of the Bishops on the subject are sober and weighty, and well worthy of consideration, especially on the part of members of the Anglican Churches.

THE CLAIMS OF INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATION.

THE new organization of industry which is known as Co-operation, is no longer a mere speculative invention of economists, a mere dream of social reformers. Its practicability, in many forms of industry at least, has been established by successes, often sufficiently encouraging, sometimes even brilliant. The utterances of the recent Lambeth Conference may force the scheme on the attention of pious minds who have looked upon it hitherto with suspicion. It may, therefore, be of some service to the movement if, by an inquiry into the justice of its claims, we shall find that it strikes its roots deep down into the soil from which all the rights of man take their growth.

The fundamental right of every man is the right to be treated as a *person* and not as a *thing*. The distinction between persons and things is one of the profoundest in human thought. A certain school of speculation indeed has, in ancient as well as in modern times, endeavoured to avoid the full recognition of this distinction by reducing persons, in the last analysis, to things. But whatever may be made of this theory as a speculation, certainly in the practice of law and morality men must treat one another as if there were an absolute distinction between a self-conscious person who knows what he does and an unconscious thing which simply does what it is impelled to do by the play of the forces surrounding it in the world. A thing, having its entire nature and action determined by the agencies of its environment, is simply a means to the accomplishment of ends outside of itself; it has, in fact, no self to form an end for anything. But a person, moulding his life and character by his own consciousness of what he is doing, is no mere instrument of outside purposes; he is an end to himself. This it is that gives every man an infinite value to himself, making him feel that the true worth of his life is to be found, not in anything external—"not in the abundance of the things that he possesseth"—that in fact he might possess the whole world of external things, and yet it would pro-

fit him nothing if he were not also master of his own self, if he were to lose his own soul.

It is, therefore, the essential fact of all justice—the foundation of every right—that every human being may, as a person, claim to be treated as his own master in the sense of being sole owner of himself. To be his own master or owner, however, implies that he has the sole right to dispose of those powers with which he has been endowed by nature, and which make him the person that he is. This is merely another way of saying that the fundamental right of personality is the right of freedom, that is, the right of a man to use himself—to use all his powers—in any way that seems good to him, so long as in doing so he does not interfere with the same right on the part of others.

It must, therefore, always be a chief end of society to vindicate the right of freedom as a reality for all its members. But to make this a reality for the labourers of the world, it is necessary to make them free, not merely in the theory of our laws, but in actual fact. For this, however, it is further necessary to keep a firm hold of the real relation between the contracting parties in a contract for labour; only thus can we avoid such a conception of that relation as would encroach on the inalienable personal rights of the labourer by reducing him to what is virtually the condition of a slave. Now, there is a description of this relation which is common among economical writers, useful enough for certain purposes, but liable to give a very dangerous misconception of the labourer's intrinsic rights. This is the description which speaks of the labourer's contract as simply an ordinary case of buying and selling. However legitimate this description may be in certain points of view, it must not be forgotten, that it is at best merely an illustration—a figure of speech—and if a figurative phrase is ridden to death by being treated as if it were a statement of literal scientific exactness, then, instead of throwing light upon the subject it is intended to illustrate, it is sure to introduce confusion, if not an absolute reversal, of the truth.

Is it, then, anything like an exact or adequate statement of fact, that the labourer, in contracting with his employer, is simply selling a commodity. There are many minor differences between the labourer's contract and an ordinary contract of sale, which need not be noticed here; but there is one fundamental distinction which is of chief interest at present. The labourer cannot, in any exact sense, be said to be selling a commodity at all. True, he is said to sell his *labour*; and misled by a common illusion of abstract language, many writers seem to think of labour as if it were a concrete thing that might be handled like a loaf of bread or a tub of butter. If the labourer were selling or even letting a machine which the buyer or hirer wanted to do a certain quantity of labour for him there would be a sufficient amount of truth in the description of the transaction as the sale of a commodity. But no civilized nation now allows by its laws, any man to treat another, or even himself, as merely a bit of mechanism to be bought and sold, or even to be let and hired, like any other commodity. In this respect the law of civilized peoples acknowledges that it cannot by its declarations make just what is not a *fact*, and it is not a fact that man is simply a machine. He is indeed an organization of certain forces which may be employed by him, like a machine, to do mechanical work; but, even when thus employing himself, he remains infinitely more than a machine. Whatever, therefore, may be the nature of the contract which an employer makes, he can never in justice treat his employee as if he were a mere machine doing work for him—as if he were a mere "hand."

If, then, the contract of a labourer cannot be correctly described as simply the sale of a commodity, what is the correct representation of it? That is a far more accurate account of the contract, which describes it as a contract of *service*; that is to say, it is a contract on the part of the labourer to put his powers of body and mind at the service of his employer. The employer desires to produce some article of value which will add to his wealth. He has obtained possession of the raw material out of which the article is to be produced; but the other factor of production—the labour required to transform this material into the article desired—he has to obtain from some one else. He seeks a workman gifted with the requisite skill, or he finds the workman seeking him; and the two enter into an agreement, each to render his own special contribution to the desired product. This is, in its essential form, the contract between employer and employee. Is there any justice, is there any scientific truth in describing this contract as if it were essentially identical with the sale and purchase of a commodity? Here there is no transference of a *thing* from one of the contracting parties to the other. There is an agreement on the part of both to unite in contributing each an indispensable factor towards the production of a joint result. They are, therefore, joint agents in the production of the object desired. In point of fact, if not in the eye of law, they are engaged in a co-operative enterprise, their contract is one of co-partnership; and there can never be any adequate recognition of justice in the contract till the remuneration of the labourer is actually based on this fact.

The possibility of carrying out such a principle of remunerating labour will be considered in another article.

J. CLARK MURRAY.

THE title of Sir Morell Mackenzie's book, by the way, is an offence to many of the author's most ardent admirers, suggesting, as it does, the hero of a transpontine melodrama, or a *Family Herald* novelette. In justice to Sir Morell Mackenzie, it should be known that he is not wholly responsible for it; it is understood that it was proposed by an exalted lady, who is very closely interested in the work. It is stated that before publication the pages were submitted to that eminent man of letters, Lord Oathorpe. This fact may, perhaps, partly account for the *raciness* of the style.—*Truth*.