

find ourselves in a deep contrast to the German school system. We, as a people, lay more stress on prescription—we require that the pupil shall conform himself to the prescribed rules of behaviour and the matter to be learned. We have more faith in the memory and are, as a people, somewhat sceptical in regard to the value of the pupil's original work. We think it is better for him to use most of his time in learning the stores that have been accumulated. Hence it comes, that the reform in education, led forward in Germany by Pestalozzi and Froebel and carried out into practice by the pedagogues of those nations, is a perpetual challenge to the educational methods of English speaking nations, and perhaps I may include, too, all other European nations. The Romanic and the Anglo-Saxon peoples have always laid more stress on memory work with children than their German contemporaries. They have filled the memory of the child with prescribed conventionalities of intelligence, and have required strict obedience to external authority in the matter of behaviour.

The German theory of education seems to take for granted, without the slightest question, the docility of the pupil. The German child belongs to a knowledge-loving race. Hence the German theory of education makes prominent the self-activity of the child as the one object of education. It repudiates foreign constraint either in conduct or in intellect. It condemns memorizing as a process of enslaving the intellect to dead items of information or opinion. It condemns the strict discipline of the schools as producing mechanical habits of obedience to the will of others. To awake the pupil's mind intellectually is theoretically the chief aim; critical alertness, and individual power to test and verify the statements of others, as

well as to undertake works of original investigation—these are the supreme objects of German pedagogy.

Students of ethnology are aware, however, that nations differ in respect to their bent of mind and their natural aptitudes. The pedagogy of peoples is wont to be based on some insight into these aptitudes and the consequent necessity of inhabiting excesses. The Germanic nations are knowledge-loving, but the Anglo-Saxon nationalities love adventure and the exercise of the will power far more than they love science. The precocious English or American child exhibits an amount of restlessness and caprice which compels his teacher to direct a large amount of nervous energy from the work of pure instruction to the work that is called discipline, or government of the school. The child with precocious directive powers, and correspondingly small love of knowledge for its own sake, is very difficult to manage in the schoolroom.

This gives us the clue to that tendency in our pedagogy and to that in all English-speaking countries, to allow intellectual instruction to degenerate into exercise of the memory alone. Memorized work may be tested with the least possible trouble—it does not distract the attention of the teacher from the work of keeping order and discipline in his school.

But ever since I began to attend educational meetings, I have heard this memory work condemned and the work of the thinking powers and original observation commended. I do not know how much longer it has been the fashion in teachers' assemblies to attack the one-sidedness of our practice. But, on reading Locke and Milton, one may conclude that it has always been the staple subject of educational discussion.

One is tempted to ask the question how much our methods have been modified.