

about which they are very touchy. My own view—and I have expressed it before—is that some diversion of shipping from the Pacific at this time would be very much worth while if it could be used for European relief purposes; that the postponement of the Pacific victory for a month or two is comparatively unimportant when compared with the long-range effect on Europe of disease, discontent, and undernourishment. Nothing could be worse than to have the liberated peoples feel they were better off materially under the Axis. In any case, Law himself thinks that enough shipping could possibly be secured without drawing on the Pacific pool, if the Americans were in fact convinced that shipping should be used for the purpose in question.

The political difficulty arises out of the fact that the Americans now will undoubtedly think that any move to rush in relief supplies for the purpose of alleviating political and economic unrest, will be interpreted in this country as a move to help the British out of their present difficulties in Greece and in Belgium; difficulties which many Americans think are of their own making. I mentioned this to Law, and he admitted the force of this argument.

Law has been here less than two days, but he is already very genuinely distressed at the feeling he has encountered against present British policy in Europe. As you know, he is far from being reactionary. He would have no sympathy whatever with a policy designed to restore reactionary regimes in Europe, but he sincerely believes that, while British tactics may have been wrong and their publicity deplorable, their fundamental policy has been right and that they have been guided only by war considerations. He pointed out, for instance, that the present Greek Prime Minister, who is being built up in the United States as the reactionary tool of British imperialism, is in fact a Socialist and anti-monarchist, whose views on political and economic questions, if expressed in this country in respect of United States institutions, would probably land him in jail.

Law, while not very optimistic, hopes that he will be able to work out some arrangements with the authorities here to get more relief supplies into Europe quickly. He also hopes that it may be possible for him in some way to explain the British position in these disputed matters. He has already seen Harry Hopkins, whom he found rather irritable and unhelpful. Hopkins' irritation, however, was due more to the attitude of the Senate toward his State Department protégés than it was to British policy in Greece or Italy or Belgium. However, his concern with this State Department trouble, I gather, made it difficult to arouse his interest over the relief supplies question. Law also hopes to see the President, though he is not sure whether this can be arranged.

Finally, he gave me a pessimistic account of the operations, or lack of operations, of UNRRA; to which I replied that the U.S. and U.K. Governments had done very little to make those operations more effective. He admitted that this might have been the case, but felt that if UNRRA had been