

the commandment, "Thou shalt not steal." But it cannot seriously be questioned, that some of the most harmful of the forms which dishonesty assumes with a Protean elusiveness in the modern business world could not be punished at all, if they had not been made the subject of definite statutory provisions. That the legislatures have not only not wasted their time in elaborating such enactments, but that they would have been derelict in their duty to the public, if they had not strengthened the hands of justice in this manner has never been doubted.

The analogy between new kinds of dishonesty in business and new kinds of political corruption seems in the present point of view to be sufficiently close to warrant the conclusion that, if the former class of offences can be effectually checked only by means of special legislation, which is therefore desirable, similar legislation for the purpose of checking the latter class of offences is neither inexpedient nor useless. The general principle of legislative policy in this connection may, it is conceived, be stated in some such form as this: Whenever a new description of immoral or dishonest conduct develops itself in a community, and it is either indisputably outside the purview of existing statutes, or not clearly within their scope, an occasion arises for the enactment of additional provisions. That form of political corruption with which we are here concerned is, so far as regards Canada, manifestly one of those which are not covered by any of the laws now in force, and if it is to be suppressed at all, must be defined and prohibited by a new statute. With all deference the author of the article in question confesses that the consideration upon which his critic relies still seems to him a wholly inadequate reason for refusing to legislate on the lines proposed. From the view of the "Bystander," that, until the standard of political morality is raised among voters themselves, it is vain to expect a total cessation of bribery in one shape or another, no one is likely to dissent. But, as already pointed out, unless analogy is to be entirely disregarded, it cannot successfully be contended that the impossibility of stamping out that offence altogether, until new ethical standards are recognized, is a suffi-