

### *Government Orders*

member institutions and in such a manner as will minimize the exposure of corporations to loss.

To fulfil its objects, CDIC may, among other things, acquire assets from a member institution; make or guarantee loans to a member; make or cause to be made inspections of member institutions; prescribe standards of sound business and financial practices for members; and act as a liquidator, receiver or inspector of a member institution or subsidiary thereof.

This particular object of the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation I think is one that most of us in this House agree with. Certainly in my party, we agree with the object of the protection and the ability of such an institution to move in and insure the deposits, particularly those of our minor depositors, shareholders and debenture holders.

My friend from the Liberal Party has pointed out the problem of harmonization which I will touch on later.

There are, I believe, 35 provincially incorporated financial institutions that are also covered by the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation. Yet CDIC does not have the same power to move in as it does with federally instituted organizations. I identify this as a potential problem for the whole situation concerning Canadian deposit insurance.

If we look at the bill now before the House, I believe the principle of the bill will assist all depositors and will assist banks and financial institutions in overcoming a problem that they have run into over the last little while.

To demonstrate the problems they have run into over the last little while we only have to note the failure of the Canadian Commercial Bank the Northland Bank, the Mercantile Bank, the Continental Bank, and Principal Trust. They affected each and every one of us and made us realize that we have to go a step further than we have so far to try to protect our financial institutions.

The Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation was instituted in approximately 1967 and is used by many banks. Over that period of time we can see some problems arising, as demonstrated by a recent article by Karen Howlett, financial reporter for *The Globe and Mail*, on February 3 of this year. She tells us that the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation ran up a deficit of \$642.6 million as of December 31, 1990 as a result of rescuing

several companies in the eighties, and that does not include Standard Trust Co. which collapsed last year costing the agency more than \$1 billion, the single most expensive bailout in CDIC's 25-year history. CDIC provided another \$445 million in loans and guarantees for last month's rescue of the First City Trust Company.

She goes on to say: "The troubled state of many companies is also fuelling debate in the industry over how CDIC finances its bailouts. The agency collects premiums from the industry, one-tenth of one per cent of the total insured deposits, for a total of \$271 million in 1990". She says that most of the burden has fallen to taxpayers. CDIC borrowed about \$1.2 billion from the government's consolidated revenue fund as of December 31, 1990.

Under this bill, as has been pointed out by the minister and my friend from the Liberal Party, the government is extending the CDIC's ability to borrow from the consolidated revenue fund, by extending its limit from \$3 billion to \$6 billion in order to support what has been an increasing burden within the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation.

I would suggest that, given what we went through just prior to the Christmas season with our four major banking bills and the breakdown of the four pillars of the banking institution within Canada, with this bill we are going to reap some of the unfortunate costs of those pillars falling.

As my friend from Nickel Belt has said in speaking on the banking acts, the Hulk Hogans, the wrestlers of the banking community, are now turning into the sumo wrestlers of the banking community. Where there were a number of Hulk Hogans there will now be one, two or three major sumo wrestlers who will slowly take over the banking community as a result of what we have seen occurring. The breakdown of those pillars gives those large banks, in particular the five major banks within Canada and some of the other major trust companies and insurance companies, the ability to take over those smaller banks, those smaller closely held financial institutions, and those smaller trust companies that cannot make it in a deregulated system.