

NATO—European Defence Community

us against the reimposition of trade restrictions on Germany as a result of these agreements. He suggested that one of the reasons—and I do not want to misinterpret what he said—Germany had to break out in aggressive warfare in 1939 was on account of these trade restrictions, and that we should be extremely careful not to reimpose them on Germany at this time. All I have to say in regard to that suggestion, Mr. Speaker, is that if I am correct in my recollection there was no other country in Europe in 1939 which imposed tighter and more exclusive trade restrictions on itself and its neighbours than nazi Germany. I would echo the hope that that kind of trade restriction policy, which is always associated with the name of Herr Schacht, should not be restored or reimposed on Germany or indeed on any other country.

The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggart, who views this protocol and its implications and the developments which surround it with mixed feelings, as indeed I suppose most of us do, felt that in the discussion of these instruments and in the length of time the west has taken to bring them to signature, the Russians have exploited the situation to win a propaganda victory. I am not so sure of that, Mr. Speaker, because I have studied these exchanges, as hon. members have, and at least one Russian note has made it clear beyond doubt to the Germans and to the rest of us that the Russian price of German unity is a restored and rearmed Germany, with few restrictions on the use of its arms, and free except in respect of the right to join the west in a system of collective defence.

Mr. Coldwell: They have played up to the nationalism of the Germans.

Mr. Pearson: They have played up to the nationalism of the Germans, but they have made it quite clear to the Germans that the price of unification is a price that includes not only nationalism but a restriction on the German right to make arrangements with the friendly and democratic west. And far more important than this in unmasking the Russian aims, these Russian notes have made it quite clear to the Germans that the Oder-Neisse boundary remains. That is another price which the Germans would have to pay for the Russian type of unification, whereas in the exchanges between Adenauer and the west on these matters the three western powers have always been careful to make clear that the permanent boundaries of Germany should be among the matters reserved for final consideration and decision at the general peace conference.

The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggart said we should never be reluctant to negotiate

with the Russians over Germany, or indeed over any other matter; that we on the western side, because we distrust their intentions and doubt their sincerity, should not refuse to discuss Germany with them. Up to a point I find myself in agreement with that position, as indeed I think the foreign ministers of other countries do. But it is one thing to agree to negotiate with the Russians on an agenda which is clear and practical, and which has previously been determined so that if you could not obtain results you could at least break off. It is something else to meet the Russians and to become involved in long propaganda discussions which on the Russian side would be used for the purpose of delaying ratification which I think now is probably the cardinal objective of their foreign policy.

Mr. Graydon: They want to get us on international tanglefoot.

Mr. Pearson: Possibly the western powers are wise in looking with some caution on these invitations to discussions. Nevertheless, having said that I should add as I said before that I hope it will be possible to press ahead with ratification and at the same time not refuse any reasonable and practicable offer for discussion.

The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggart emphasized that there were a great many sections of opinion in Germany and outside Germany who were worried about these agreements, and he felt that we should be very careful not to go ahead with them until we knew what the Germans themselves wished. I agree, but that is what we are trying to find out from now on. We are trying to find out what the Germans, the French, the British and the Americans, and indeed all the peoples concerned, do wish—especially the Germans. That is the purpose for instance of submitting these documents to the West German parliament for ratification.

When we talk about what the Germans wish, all we know now is that the government which is in control of Western Germany as a result of free elections has agreed to this policy, and that all the steps along the road to the signature of these treaties by the West Germans have been taken after discussion with Chancellor Adenauer and his government who do represent at the present time the West German people. If he loses their support and the parliament refuses to ratify these agreements, then everything is off and we have to start all over again. There is nothing that I can see to suggest that these documents have been forced upon a reluctant people, because every single legislature concerned with every single