

countries not only ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco (the recalcitrant Cubans coming in as the last player) but also the NPT.

The "happy ending" appeared to have arrived. But analysts were quick to point out that it had been a "near run thing." If military or nationalist governments had continued to rule in one or both countries, things might have turned out very different indeed. If the Argentine armed forces had not been so thoroughly discredited, along with nationalist opinion in that country, anything would have been possible. If the Argentine economy had recovered earlier and without Menem's shock therapy, such pragmatism in international affairs might have been more difficult to achieve. If Brazil had really been determined on regional hegemony, temptations might have been too great to beg off early from nuclear weapons and the prestige that often goes with them. If both sides had not applied careful diplomacy to each stage of the last years of this story, nationalist opinion might still have carried the day.

Thus the South American nuclear story could have been very different from the one we know today. Indeed, it is a fair argument that a return to military government, or nationalist authoritarian regimes, might well bring calls for a return to nuclear programmes with weapons options. And a return to military government cannot be completely discounted in the future. Both countries, but especially Brazil, face stark social and economic problems, especially a spiralling crime wave, which may eventually make a return to a harder government more palatable. And the collapse of the Mercosur trading and common market proposal, which offers so much hope to the Southern Cone today, could lead to greater, not lesser, feelings of antipathy. Such scenarios seem far away but they do help to keep one's eyes open to the very special diplomatic, political, economic, civil-military relations and other contexts that played a role in bringing this rivalry back under control.

THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE INDIA-PAKISTAN RIVALRY

India and Pakistan received independence from the United Kingdom as late as 1947. They were thus almost a century and a half later in controlling their own diplomacy than were Argentina and Brazil. And their rivalry and disputes date from a mere half-century ago rather than two to five centuries. Thus it is tempting to say the problem is a more recent one, and of course in some senses it is. Furthermore, India and Pakistan were under the same administration with the Raj, while this had not happened with the two South American giants since the early 17th century. A complicated partition arrangement was expected to reduce much of the animosity between the founding peoples of what were to be two states emerging from the vast polity of British India.

Such thoughts do not, however, tell us much about the degree to which the disputes between the two South Asian countries are deep and pervasive. The sub-continent is a region of great and ancient cultures that have produced powerful states in the past. The Muslim tradition in Pakistan is impressive, and the country considers itself an inheritor of much of the great past of that religion, including links with an *ouma* (community) around the globe, and a history of military prowess and power. The Moghul Empire, a Muslim state, was the last to rule most of the region and gave way