On-site inspections (OSIs) provide the verifying party with direct access to the facilities and TLEs/TLIs of the other side. There are four general types of on-the-ground OSIs: pre-agreement trial inspections; routine or short-notice inspections of declared facilities; challenge or suspect-site inspections of undeclared or suspect sites; and invitational inspections, offered by a country in order to remove ambiguities or reduce uncertainties.

Aerial Inspections include inspection of sites and TLEs/TLIs using a wide variety of sensors, many of which are similar to those described above for NTM/ITM/MTM, carried aboard fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters for overhead inspection purposes.

Although **Open Skies** is considered a transparency measure rather than a verification mode, because it is a cooperative form of aerial surveillance involving sensors and human observers, it offers the potential for synergies with the verification methods discussed above.

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), in the form of notifications, calendars of military events, information exchanges, and invitational observations of military exercises also hold potential for synergistic effects with NTM/ITM/MTM/NIM and certain cooperative measures. While various verification methods can be CBMs, not all CBMs will contribute to verification.

Synergistic Effects Among Methods

NTM/ITM/MTM and Data Exchanges. NTM/ITM/MTM provide limited, but useful information on the nature and scope of information expected to be included in data exchanges; on the other hand, data exchanges provide highly useful information for enhancing present and future monitoring capabilities. For example, information on technical characteristics, numbers, and locations of TLEs, and site diagrams provides "sanity checks" on data based on NTM/ITM/MTM and provides guidance for revising and upgrading the overall conclusions and capabilities of NTM/ITM/MTM. The CFE Treaty includes data exchanges on: types, nomenclature, and calibre of armaments; locations by geographic name and coordinates of TLEs, including numbers and types of armaments at each location; organizational structure and nomenclature of land and air forces; and photographs presenting a side, top, and front view of each TLE. The accuracy of much of these data can be confirmed by OSIs, as will be discussed later. Integrating such a comprehensive data base with that available from NTM/ITM/MTM provides a sound foundation for assuring effective verification of the Treaty. The synergies resulting from periodic updating of the information in the data exchanges and the continuing iteration between these data and those from NTM/ITM/MTM clearly enhance verification capabilities.

NTM/ITM/MTM and Notifications. As in the case of data exchanges, NTM/ITM/MTM has only a modest effect on notifications, but notifications have a substantial effect on NTM/ITM/MTM. NTM/ITM/MTM can provide insights regarding expected notifications, and in some cases confirm that the notified action has taken or is taking place. Prior notifications, on the other hand, can trigger a variety of NTM/ITM/MTM collection activities; in many cases, these activities will result in the acquisition of valuable information which might have been missed without such notifications. For example, the START agreement requires extensive and comprehensive notifications on a variety of activities associated with TLIs, including: movements; conversions and eliminations; a variety of flight tests; reduction in attributed warheads; operational dispersals; transfer of TLIs to/from