


DEFENCE NOTES



American Views of Canadian Nuclear Subs

■ In October 1987, Congressman Charles Bennet, Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Sea Power, wrote an article for the *Globe and Mail* criticizing the decision to purchase nuclear submarines, and suggesting that the US Congress had an independent power to review the prospective transfer of nuclear technology for the British designed Trafalgar submarine regardless of any agreement entered into between the US Administration and the British government. Recently, Senator John Warner, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and former Secretary of the Navy, also indicated that a Canadian purchase of the Trafalgar would be a subject of Senate hearings.

More stridently, Frank Gaffney, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, has accused the Canadian Government of increasing the risk of accident by trying to buy nuclear submarines on the cheap. Gaffney claims in a 12 April article in the *Globe and Mail* that Canada is unwilling to face the real costs of developing the infrastructure, expertise, and regulatory measures necessary for a national nuclear submarine programme.

Despite these objections, the news from the Washington summit of 27 April was that President Reagan promised Prime Minister Mulroney he would not block a British sale. In the *Washington Post* of 28 April, a State Department spokesman stressed that Reagan approved such a purchase "because of the unique circumstances involving . . . two of our oldest and closest allies. The

United States remains opposed to the transfer of nuclear submarines to other nations."

Withdrawal from Norway

■ In a speech to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, former Chief of Defence Staff General Gérard Thériault made it clear that he disagreed with the government decision outlined in last summer's White Paper on Defence to withdraw from Norway and consolidate Canada's forces in Germany. Placing the Canadian forces in the context of NATO's full military strength, Thériault described them as "next to nothing in military terms," and argued that the commitment to send a brigade to Norway in time of crisis was a valued NATO asset.

Other sources have now apparently confirmed that an earlier version of the Defence White Paper proposed to withdraw Canadian forces from Central Europe, and to strengthen the commitment to Norway. Defence analyst Gwynne Dyer (*Globe and Mail* 22 April) maintains that former Defence Minister Erik Neilsen developed the plan in 1985, and received a favorable reception in Washington, but was subject to such severe criticism by the German and British Governments that the plan was withdrawn. The Neilsen plan allegedly called for the pre-positioning of heavy equipment in Norway, a transit base in Scotland, and air transportation of the entire brigade in time of crisis.

Patrolling Pacific Airspace

■ Recent newspaper reports have drawn attention to the increasing number of cruise missile carrying Soviet Bear bombers making practice runs against Alaska and the US-Canadian West coast. According to NORAD, the number of interceptions by Canadian and US fighters has increased significantly in the last year. However, all accounts refer to Soviet approaches to US or Canadian airspace: there

are no reports of actual intrusions into national airspace.

Interviews with air force commanders suggest that NORAD interceptors are highly successful in detecting and intercepting Soviet flights. But, it is also apparent that the peacetime interception of the large, slow Bear bombers has little relevance to the likely sequence of events in hostilities. Testifying before the Standing Committee on National Defence in late March, Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty conceded that the North Warning System, like any ground-based radar, might not be able to detect low-flying cruise missiles. (See *Peace&Security*, Spring 1988 for similar problems associated with the Over-the-Horizon radars now being deployed.)

In the event of hostilities, cruise or ballistic missiles would first

attack the radar installations of NORAD, and then the interceptor bases. Only then would the large slow Bears penetrate North American airspace in search of their targets. NORAD has no defences against ballistic missile attack, and little or no capability against cruise missiles once they have been released.

Opposition Party Defence Policies

■ In 1987, under the authorship of defence critic Derek Blackburn, the NDP issued a policy statement re-affirming the long-standing party policy to withdraw from NATO and NORAD. In April 1988 the International Affairs Committee of the NDP published a longer report, entitled *Canada's Stake in Common Security*, dealing with both defence and arms con-

ALLIANCE NEWS

Denmark and Nuclear Weapons

■ Following a snap election on 10 May called for the purposes of deciding whether the country should enforce a ban on entry of ships carrying nuclear weapons, the issue remains unresolved as of the time this issue of *Peace&Security* goes to press. The election was forced when, contrary to the wishes of the Danish Prime Minister, parliament passed a resolution forcing all visiting ships – including ships of Denmark's NATO allies – to declare whether or not they were carrying nuclear weapons. The resolution caused sharp comment from both the British and the Americans; both countries regularly arm their vessels with nuclear weapons and both refuse to divulge which ships are carrying them. The resolution, if enforced, would have the effect of barring the visits of American and British ships.

After meeting in Brussels on 27 April the NATO defence ministers warned Denmark that such a move would undermine the unity of the Alliance. British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe said the consequences would be "extremely serious," and US Secretary of State George Shultz was reported (*Toronto Star*, 29 April) to have told the Danish Foreign Minister: "If you like the benefits [of belonging to NATO] you ought to accept the responsibilities." Following the election in which neither of the major political blocs made notable gains in parliament, Prime Minister Paul Schluter said: "The parties who voted for the Social Democratic motion on NATO [barring nuclear-weapon carrying ships] have been weakened . . . I expect the result will ease our relationship with NATO."

NATO Military Doctrine and Conventional Weapons

■ After the 2-3 March meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, the Communique issued by the heads of state re-asserted