

system. These delegations believed that the complex problem of effective verification procedures, acceptable to all, should be seriously addressed in a co-operative manner. Finally, they pointed out that dealing with separate classes of weapons was already an established practice, universally recognized in other disarmament fields. Some delegations expressed the view that the question of the establishment of a world space organization was not within the competence of the Conference on Disarmament.

44. Delegations of the group of socialist countries suggested proceeding, without awaiting the conclusion of the relevant agreement on space, to the establishment of an international verification system -- an international inspectorate -- for the non-deployment on outer space of weapons of any kind. The principal purpose of this verification will be to make sure that objects launched into space are neither weapons, nor are equipped with weapons of any kind. The suggested verification system would envisage the permanent presence of inspection groups at all sites for launching space objects with a view to verifying all such objects irrespective of their means of launching. Information about each upcoming launch, including the location of the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object to be launched and the time of launch would be given in advance to the representatives of the inspectorate. Should an undeclared launch be suspected, the inspectorate would have the right to request the relevant information from the specially-designated observatories and also conduct, if necessary, an on-site inspection. Should the future agreement envisage a complete ban on space strike arms, inspections could be extended to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centres, etc. Launches of ballistic missiles unrelated to putting any space craft into the artificial Earth satellite orbit or on a flight path toward other celestial bodies should not be covered by verification.

45. Some delegations foresaw substantial technical, political and organizational difficulties associated with an international verification inspectorate. In this regard, they believed that one had also to keep in mind that virtually any space object, if controlled and manipulated properly, is capable of serving as a weapon. They stated that this basic fact plus many technical, definitional, organizational and political obstacles bar the way to a successful international verification inspectorate.

46. Other delegations believed, however, that the actual capacity of using such space objects as weapons could become militarily significant only after extensive field testing in such a mode, and that the possibilities offered by an international inspectorate, combined with existing methods of monitoring space objects, would effectively ensure verifiability of an agreement not to introduce weapons in outer space. In this regard, they pointed out that the technical, political and organizational difficulties referred to could be overcome in a co-operative manner, as had been done with respect to many other disarmament agreements.

47. Some delegations, expressing concern at restrictions being placed on the transfer of space technology, reiterated that it was necessary in the consideration of proposals to contemplate ways and means of strengthening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, so that all States would have access without discrimination to space technology to promote