

tion of non-aggressive postures, and (b) the enhancement of crisis-management capabilities commensurate with a reduction of the danger of surprise attack.

Unlike arms limitations agreements, which require the careful monitoring of numerical levels of forces, CBMs focus on intentions. Yet, the problems of assessing intentions are bypassed, for compliance requires only the verification of those major actions which presumably reflect intentions.

This raises a conceptual issue. Arms limitation agreements incorporate substantive measures, ... CBMs, however, as the stalking horses of substantive arms limitation agreements, are designed to be essentially symbolic – changing perceptions, rather than limiting forces. *This is often obscured in practice, however, for a number of CBM are de facto substantive arms limitation measures ...*

CBMs, therefore, reduce the likelihood of a surprise attack by providing early warning indicators of possible adversary preparations of aggression. Adversaries are thus able to lower their defensive postures and defence spending with a commensurate lowering of tensions and the risk of war.<sup>42</sup>

### ***The Attributes of Confidence-Building "Definitions"***

Someone new to the study of CBM and CSBM could be forgiven for finding the foregoing "menu" of "definitions" overwhelming. These descriptive accounts are lengthy, often imprecise, sometimes contradictory (or apparently so) and occasionally obscure. The number of descriptive accounts of what constitutes a Confidence-Building Measure could be increased beyond the selection presented here but that would scarcely improve things. Although there is a fairly clear sense of common objectives present in these lengthy descriptions, there is also a disturbing lack of clarity or even consensus. On some attributes, the descriptions are even contradictory. If we were to extract the main points from descriptive

definitions of CBMs, we would have a sizeable and sometimes contradictory list of attributes. Such a list, however, might yield some fairly coherent general sense of what a CBM actually is.

1. CBMs encompass a *broad array* of legitimate concerns, including technological, cultural, economic, political and military matters where successful bilateral and multilateral undertakings, exchanges and agreements increase understanding and, hence, confidence and trust.
2. CBMs are a specific category of state behaviour relating to security and military matters.
3. CBMs constitute a specific concept of security policy and arms control. These measures relate to specific threats and attempt to reduce or eliminate those threats.
4. CBMs must be militarily significant and adequately verifiable to have any meaning as confidence builders.
5. CBMs entail the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats.
6. CBMs entail the transmission and verification of credible evidence that military forces and their activities do not constitute a threat to the security, sovereignty or political stability of any state.
7. CBMs are intended to provide circumstantial evidence indicating that a feared threat is reduced or eliminated.
8. The purpose of CBMs is to reduce the danger resulting from inaccurate (military) information.
9. The purpose of CBMs is to eliminate the possibility of surprise attack.
10. CBMs reduce the likelihood of a surprise attack by providing early warning and indicators of possible adversary preparations.
11. CBMs are primarily of a political and psychological nature but operate in the domain of military activity.
12. CBMs don't (shouldn't) really have very much to do with psychology.
13. The objective of CBMs is to ensure the correct interpretation of intentions.
14. CBMs are designed to lend credibility to affirmations of peaceful intentions.

<sup>42</sup> Abbott A. Brayton, "Confidence-Building Measures in European Security," *The World Today*, October 1980, p. 384.

