

## U. United States Proposal, November 18, 1947

### CONSIDERATION OF VOTING PROCEDURE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The General Assembly, in the exercise of its power to make recommendations relating to the powers and functions of any organs of the United Nations (Article 10),

Requests the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 2 (a) of the resolution of the General Assembly of 13 November, 1947, establishing that Committee, to:

(1) Consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all proposals which have been or may be submitted by Members of the United Nations to the Second Session of the General Assembly or to the Interim Committee;

(2) Consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to co-operate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem;

(3) Report with its conclusions to the Third Session of the General Assembly, the report to be transmitted to the Secretary-General by 15 July, 1948, and by the Secretary-General to the Members and to the General Assembly.

Requests the permanent members of the Security Council to consult with one another on the problem of voting in the Security Council in order to secure agreement among them on measures to ensure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions.

## V. Canadian Statement, November 11, 1947

### RELATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH SPAIN

I should like to say a few words in explanation of the vote that the delegation of Canada proposes to pass on these resolutions that are before the Committee.

We feel that we will have to vote in opposition to the resolution of Poland. If we were to select speeches that come closest to representing our point of view, they would be the speeches by the representatives of Pakistan and the Netherlands made this morning.

Briefly stated, the reasons why we feel that we must oppose the Polish resolution are:

First, because nothing in the way of effective sanctions can flow from it. The Security Council cannot apply Article 41 without first determining that there is a threat to the peace under Article 39, and there is no serious allegation of a threat to the peace. It would be very doubtful if any such allegation could be proved if it were made.

Therefore we feel that the resolution, if passed, would be entirely ineffective and could not properly be acted upon. It would be a futile gesture by the United Nations, much as if we were making a face at