

the early 1950's it was often discussed by the Conservative Government. On the Tenth Anniversary of NATO Mr. Diefenbaker stated that NATO "is more than a military alliance. It must develop and expand the economic principles in the Treaty...."<sup>3</sup> Howard Green made the same point on his return from Oslo in 1961 as the future of NATO was related to its "ability to adopt itself to a changing world....It has to face complex new challenges, political, economic, psychological, as well as military, which are continuing to develop."<sup>4</sup>

#### Issue II - Consultation - 1960-1963.

The question of the role of the smaller powers within the alliance led both Howard Green and John Diefenbaker to frequently speak out on the need for greater consultation as a necessary step to keep NATO functioning properly. On his report to the NATO Council in October of 1959, Mr. Green mentioned that "the Canadian Government has consistently emphasized the great significance of political consultation within the Alliance." Even though he went to say that he was "encouraged by the considerable progress which has been made"<sup>5</sup> it became clear, on his return to Ottawa, that in his opinion discussion by the big powers had to be more open while giving the smaller powers a greater say in policy decisions.<sup>6</sup>

The Prime Minister agreed with Howard Green, and in his DePauw University speech of June, 1960 Mr. Diefenbaker noted there was a "special obligation on the larger more powerful members to make a reality of consultation, and to reconcile the responsibilities of leadership with those of true partnership. I tell you frankly...still more can be done."<sup>7</sup> In July of 1960 Mr. Green was stating to the House that "we are still plagued by the question of consultation in NATO....It is obvious you cannot keep an alliance strong if you do not have adequate consultation...."<sup>8</sup>

#### Issue III - Berlin, 1961

The Berlin crisis was on the horizon during the early part of 1961, but did not come to a head until August 13, 1961 when traffic between East and West Berlin was restricted and the wall started to go up. Two days later the Prime Minister took a strong stand on the Berlin question in a speech given in Halifax. The closing of the border had united the free world, and NATO forces should be armed with the best weapons possible while being brought up to strength. On the moves by Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Diefenbaker stated that "We will not permit him to succeed by any effort to undermine the basic unity of purpose of the free world, or divert us from our determination to preserve the freedom of West Berlin and Western rights of access to that city."<sup>9</sup> This statement was followed by the hint that Canada might increase its European NATO commitment, and in a speech on September 1, 1961, Mr. Diefenbaker said that "Canada in NATO is responsible for its share of European defence....Under NATO we have undertaken to regard an armed attack against Berlin as if it were an attack on Canada."<sup>10</sup> In backing up this strongly worded position the Government announced on September 7th that the Canadian forces in Europe would be increased by approximately 1,000 troops, and that the ceiling of the armed services would be raised from 120,000 to 135,000.<sup>11</sup> While taking a firm stand on Berlin the Government also made it quite clear that negotiation was necessary to solve the differences between the East and the West.